Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 52
Issue 2 March 2019

Article 2

2019

An Empirical Study of Dispute Resolution Clauses in International
Supply Contracts
John F. Coyle
Christopher R. Drahozal

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons

Recommended Citation
John F. Coyle and Christopher R. Drahozal, An Empirical Study of Dispute Resolution Clauses in
International Supply Contracts, 52 Vanderbilt Law Review 323 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol52/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

An Empirical Study of Dispute
Resolution Clauses
in International Supply Contracts
John F. Coyle* & ChristopherR. Drahozal"
ABSTRACT

Internationaltransactionspresent unique legal risks. When
a contract touches several different nations, a party may not know
where it will be called upon to defend a lawsuit or, alternatively,
which nation's law will be applied to resolve that dispute. To
mitigate these risks, parties will often write dispute resolution
provisions into their contracts. Arbitration clauses and forum
selection clauses help to reduce uncertainty relatingto the forum.
Choice-of-law clauses help to reduce uncertainty as to the
governing law. Over the past few decades, such provisions have
become commonplace in internationalcontracting.And yet there
exist vanishinglyfew empirical studies exploring the use of these
provisions in internationalcommercial agreements.
This Article aspires to fill this gap. Drawing upon a handcollected dataset of 157 international supply agreements, it
describes the ways in which large corporationsseek to mitigate
their risk in international transactions via dispute resolution
clauses. The Article first provides a thorough descriptive account
of choice-of-law clauses in these agreements to illustrate the
myriad ways these clauses do and do not mitigate legal risk. It
then undertakes the same project with respect to arbitration
clauses and forum selection clauses, paying careful attention to
the ways in which actualpractice deviates from the model forms
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promulgated by arbitrationgroups, to show how these clauses
mitigate forum risk.
While the primary objective of the Article is descriptive
rather than normative-it seeks to describe the contents of
agreements that have heretofore been largely ignored by legal
scholars-it also discusses the normative implications of its
descriptive account for three groups. First, legal scholars may
draw upon this account to better understand how contract
boilerplate evolves and changes over time. Second, judges called
upon to interpreta contract may utilize this account to determine
whether a phrase is typically included in clauses of a given type.
Third, and finally, contract drafters may glean useful insights
into how to craft dispute resolution provisions that maximize the
reduction in uncertainty in internationalcontracting.
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I. INTRODUCTION

One notable gap in the growing empirical literature on the terms
and provisions of contracts is studies of the dispute resolution clauses
in international commercial contracts.' A number of studies have
examined the terms and provisions of arbitration clauses in domestic

1.
Zev J. Eigen, Empirical Studies of Contract, 8 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Sci. 291,
297 & fig. 2 (2012) (reporting that "[t]he most frequently asked question," comprising 29
percent of the 113 empirical studies of contracts in the sample, was "Which terms are
included in contracts?"); see Geoffrey P. Miller, Empirical Analysis of Legal Theory: In
Honor of Theodore Eisenberg, 171 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 6, 6 (2015)
(summarizing studies by Eisenberg and Miller). See also generally Norman D. Bishara,
Kenneth J. Martin, & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of Noncompetition
Clauses and Other Restrictive Postemployment Covenants, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2015);
John F. Coyle, The Canons of Constructionfor Choice-of-Law Clauses, 92 WASH. L. REV.
631 (2017) [hereinafter Coyle, Canons]; John F. Coyle, The Role of the CISG in U.S.
ContractPractice:An EmpiricalStudy, 38 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 195 (2016) [hereinafter Coyle,
CISG]; Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are "Pay Now, Terms Later" Contracts Worse for
Buyers? Evidence from Software License Agreements, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 309 (2009);
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form Contracts:
The Case of Software License Agreements, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 447 (2008);
Robert Taylor & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Set in Stone? Change and Innovation in
Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 240 (2013).
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4
3
US contracts, including consumer, 2 franchise, CEO employment, and
5
But while several studies have
material corporate contracts.
and forum selection clauses in
clauses
examined the use of arbitration
the studies looked beyond the
have
rarely
only
international contracts,
litigation to the detailed
and
basic choice between arbitration
6
have attracted even
clauses
Choice-of-law
clauses.
provisions of those
less academic attention.
This Article takes steps toward filling this gap in the empirical
literature. It provides a detailed analysis of the terms and provisions
of choice-of-law clauses, arbitration clauses, and forum selection
clauses in a hand-collected dataset of 157 international supply
contracts. Some findings worthy of note include the following:

See, e.g., CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY:
2.
REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER

PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a) at § 2 (2015) [hereinafter CFPB FINAL REPORT]; see also
Michael L. Rustad et al., An Empirical Study of Predispute Mandatory Arbitration
Clauses in Social Media Terms of Service Agreements, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
643, 653-61 (2012). See generally James R. Bucilla II, The Online Crossroadsof Website
Terms of Service Agreements and Consumer Protection: An Empirical Study of
Arbitration Clauses in the Terms of Service Agreements for the Top 100 Websites Viewed
in the United States, 15 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 102 (2014); Christopher

&

R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration Clauses in Credit Card Agreements: An
Empirical Study, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 536 (2012) (showing how most credit card
issuers do not use arbitration clauses in their agreements); Thomas H. Koenig & Michael
L. Rustad, Fundamentally Unfair:An Empirical Analysis of Social Media Arbitration
Clauses, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 341 (2014); Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R.Drahozal, Contract and Choice, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2013); Elizabeth C. Tippett
Bridget Schaaff, How Concepcion and Italian Colors Affected Terms of Service Contracts
in the Gig Economy, 70 RUTGERS L. REV. 459 (2018).
See generally Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There a
3.
Flight from Arbitration, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71 (2008); Christopher R. Drahozal,
"Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695 (2001); see also generally
Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and
Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549 (2003)
(arguing that deterrence has played a role in the increased presence of arbitration
clauses in franchise contracts); Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, "Sticky"
Arbitration Clauses? The Use of Arbitration Clauses After Concepcion and Amex, 67
VAND. L. REV. 955 (2014) (finding that the increased presence of arbitration clauses in
franchise contracts has not been a dramatic shift).
See generally Erin O'Hara, Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S. Thomas,
4.
Customizing Employment Arbitration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 133 (2012); Randall S. Thomas,
Erin O'Hara & Kenneth J. Martin, Arbitration Clauses in CEO Employment Contracts:
An Empirical and TheoreticalAnalysis, 63 VAND. L. REV. 959 (2010).
See generally John C. Coates, IV, Managing Disputes Through Contract:
5.
Evidence from M&A, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 295 (2012) (documenting how these
arbitration clauses affect M&A litigation); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the
Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335 (2007) [hereinafter
Eisenberg & Miller, Arbitration]; David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure, 2014
U. ILL. L. REV. 389; W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Customized Procedure in Theory and
Reality, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1865 (2015) (documenting the considerations that go
into including arbitration procedures in contracts).
See infra text accompanying notes 82-93.
6.
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Prevalence of Dispute Resolution Clauses. Virtually all the
international supply agreements in the sample (99 percent) contained
a choice-of-law clause. Slightly more than half of the agreements (55
percent) contained an arbitration clause. Just over a third of the
agreements (36 percent) contained a forum selection clause.
New York as Neutral Jurisdiction. When the parties to international
supply agreements involving at least one US party chose a "neutral"
jurisdiction with no connection to either party, they overwhelmingly
gravitated to New York in their choice-of-law clauses, their arbitration
clauses, and their forum selection clauses.
Gaps in the Choice-of-Law Clauses. Most of the choice-of-law clauses
(80 percent) in the agreements did not address the issue of scope (i.e.,
whether the chosen law applies to tort and statutory claims as well as
contract claims). A similar percentage (76 percent) did not address the
distinction between substantive and procedural law.
The CISG. The parties expressly opted out of the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) in
39 percent of the international supply agreements. They expressly
opted in to the CISG in less than 1 percent of the agreements. Slightly
more than 60 percent of the agreements contained no express reference
to the CISG.
Departures from Model Arbitration Clauses. Most of the arbitration
clauses departed in notable ways from the standard language
suggested by international arbitration institutions. For example, the
86 arbitration clauses in the sample included 70 different formulations
of the language defining the scope of the clause, and barely one-third
(37.2 percent) expressly identified the arbitral seat (most clauses
instead identified a location for the arbitral proceeding).
Class Arbitration and Confidentiality. Almost no arbitration clauses in
the sample expressly precluded class arbitration, and few imposed any
obligation of confidentiality on the parties.
State and Federal Court. Most of the forum selection clauses selecting
a US jurisdiction did not evidence a preference for either state or
federal court. Among those clauses that expressed a preference,
slightly more parties opted to litigate in state court rather than in
federal court.
Part II describes the sample and the limitations of the study's
findings. Part III examines the choice-of-law provisions in the
contracts. Part IV describes the arbitration clauses in detail, while
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Part V describes the forum selection clauses in detail. Part VI
concludes by discussing some of the normative implications of the
Article's findings.

II. SAMPLE AND LIMITATIONS

The

sample consists

of 157 international

supply contracts

collected from filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) from January 1, 2011, through December 31, 2015.
A team of research assistants were instructed to search for "supply /2
agreement" in the "Material Contracts" section of the SEC's EDGAR
database. 7 These searches resulted in 5,549 hits. A research assistant
then reviewed each of these agreements to determine whether the
contract at issue was an "international" supply agreement involving at
least one non-US party. Once this initial review was complete, there
remained 248 international supply agreements. Duplicate contracts,
amendments to previous contracts, and contracts that were formatted
in a manner that made them unreadable were then removed from the
sample. Once this process was complete, there were 157 unique
agreements remaining, which comprise the sample analyzed in this
Article.
Several characteristics of the sample are worth noting. First, as
already stated, the sample is limited to international supply contracts.
As discussed in Part IV.A, the use of dispute resolution clauses varies
8
substantially across different types of contracts. Accordingly, one
must be very cautious in extrapolating these findings to types of
contracts other than the type studied.
Second, almost all of the contracts in the sample have at least one
US party, meaning (because they are international contracts) they
almost always were entered into between a US party and a non-US
party.9 The US party was the buyer in 102 of the contracts and the
10
seller in 52, with the remaining 3 contracts between non-US parties.
Because the empirical results here are essentially limited to contracts
with a US party, they may not be generalizable to contracts between
non-US parties.

The searches were conducted through the LexisNexis portal.
7.
See infra text accompanying notes 76-81.
8.
If there were multiple non-US buyers or sellers, we coded the nationality of
9.
the buyer or seller based on the first party listed in the contract. Twelve contracts had
multiple parties as buyer or seller of which one was a US party. We coded the nationality
of the buyer or seller in those contracts based on the first non-US party listed in the
contract, recognizing the possibility that the US party may have played an important
role in negotiating and drafting the contract.
The most common country of origin of the non-US parties was Canada (22
10.
contracts), followed by three European countries (Germany (13 contracts), the UK (12
contracts), and Switzerland (11 contracts)), China (10 contracts), and Japan (also 10
contracts). For a complete list of the non-US parties, see infra Appendix A.
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Third, the contracts in the sample were all identified by the filing
party as "material" contracts, defined by SEC regulations as contracts
"not made in the ordinary course of business."" The contracts studied
thus do not include routine contracts and may not be representative of
such contracts.' 2 As stated by Mark Weidemaier, "[b]y definition,
material contracts are not representative of all contracts."' 8
Fourth, the contracts in the sample are concentrated in three
industries; contracts from other industries may differ.1 4 Far and away
the most common industry for the contracts in the sample was the
pharmaceutical industry,' 5 comprising 45.9 percent (72 of 157) of the
contracts. Companies producing medical supplieS1 6 (18 of 157, or 11.5
percent) and electronic components and accessories 17 (12 of 157, or 7.6
percent) were the only other industry groupings with ten or more
contracts in the sample.
Fifth, while the contracts in the sample were all filed with the SEC
from 2011 through 2015, some were entered into between the parties
before those years. As summarized in Table 1, 68.2 percent (107 of 157)
of the contracts were entered into from 2011 through 2015. By
comparison, 22.9 percent (36 of 157) were entered into between 2007
and 2010, and 5.7 percent (9 of 157) were entered into before 2007. (The
date of contracting was missing for 3.2 percent (5 of 157) of the
contracts.) To the extent the terms of dispute resolution clauses change
over time, the results here might not reflect the current state of such
provisions.18
Table 1. Year of Contracting for International
Supply Contractsin Sample
Number (%)
Year
of Clauses
2015
12 (7.6%)
2014
13 (8.3%)
2013
21 (13.4%)
2012
38 (24.2%)

11.
17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(10)(i) (2013).
12.
See Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or
Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. DIsP. RESOL. 433, 463-67 (2010) (showing
that arbitration clauses are less common in material contracts than in ordinary course
of business contracts and thus it is useful to study material contracts that contain them).
13.
Weidemaier, supra note 5, at 1906.
14.
We categorized the industries based on the SIC Industry Group as identified
in the SEC filings.
15.
SIC Industry Grouping 283 ("Drugs").
16.
SIC Industry Grouping 384 ("Surgical, Medical, and Dental Instruments and
Supplies").
17.
SIC Industry Grouping 367 ("Electronic Components and Accessories").
18.
We do not have enough contracts in the sample to identify changes in contract
terms over time reliably.
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2011

23 (14.6%)

2010
2009

15 (9.6%)
9 (5.7%)

2008
2007

6(3.8%)
6(3.8%)

Pre-2007
Missing

9 (5.7%)
5 (3.2%)

Total

157

[vot. 52:323

III. CHOICE-OF-LAW CLAUSES IN INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CONTRACTS

This Part provides a detailed look at the provisions included in
choice-of-law clauses in the sample of international supply contracts.
It first discusses prior studies that have looked at the provisions in
international choice-of-law clauses. It then examines these provisions
in the sample of international commercial agreements reviewed for
this Article.
A. Background
The empirical studies relating to choice-of-law clauses may be
usefully sorted into two baskets. The first basket contains studies that
seek to determine which jurisdictions (e.g., New York) are named as
the governing law. The second basket contains studies that are less
focused on the choice of jurisdiction than on the other language in the
clause. To date, most of the empirical research in this area has focused
on the first issue. The results of the most significant studies from the
past decade are briefly recounted below.
In 2009, Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller reviewed 2,865
contracts filed with the SEC over a seven-month period in 2002.19 Their
goal was to identify the governing law for each agreement. They found
that New York occupied a dominant position in this regard-it supplied
20
the governing law in roughly 46 percent of the agreements. Delaware
was a distant second at 15 percent, and California came in third at just
under 8 percent. 2 1 They also found that the chosen law varied
depending on the type of agreement at issue. Across the board, New

19.
See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New
York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in PubliclyHeld Companies' Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475 (2009) [hereinafter Eisenberg,
Flight to NY] (their study did not report data on contracts for the sale of goods as a
separate category).
Id. at 1478.
20.
Id. at 1490.
21.
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York law was chosen significantly more often for all contract types. The
exceptions were (1) employment agreements, (2) licensing agreements,
(3) settlements, and (4) trusts. 22 The chosen law for these first three
types was eclectic and did not cluster in any one state. With respect to
trusts, the jurisdiction of choice was Delaware. 2 3
In 2014, Sarath Sanga developed a computer program that
collected and then analyzed the text of every contract filed with the
SEC between 1996 and 2012.24 Of the 495,999 contracts that contained
a choice-of-law clause, Sanga found that 27.3 percent of the contracts
chose New York law, 12.4 percent chose Delaware law, and 10.5
percent chose California law. 2 5 Approximately 21 percent of these
agreements were equity plans, 18.6 percent were credit agreements,
15.3 percent were employment agreements, and 9.2 percent were
purchase agreements. 26
In 2014, Gilles Cuniberti reviewed data from 4,427 cases that
came before the International Court of Arbitration of the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) between 2007 and 2012.27 He found that
when the parties to these proceedings chose a "neutral" law-the law
of a third state with no connection to either party-to govern their
agreement, they tended to gravitate to the law of a relatively small
number of jurisdictions. 2 8 Approximately 11.2 percent of the contracts
reviewed chose English law for this purpose, and an additional 9.9
percent chose Swiss law. 29 The laws of various US states (3.6 percent),
France (3.1 percent), and Germany (2 percent) rounded out the top
five.3 0 In reporting these results, Cuniberti noted that European
companies typically account for more than half of the parties in ICC
arbitrations. 31
In 2015, Mark Weidemaier reviewed 402 commercial agreements
filed with the SEC between 2000 and 2012.32 Approximately 60 percent
of these agreements arose out of domestic transactions between US
companies, 34 percent arose out of international transactions involving
at least one US party, and 6 percent arose out of international

22.
Id. at 1491.
23.
Id.; see also Geoffrey P. Miller & Theodore Eisenberg, The Market for
Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2073 (2009) (stating that Delaware law "exercises an
important but secondary influence" to New York in the realm of material contracts).
24.
Sarath Sanga, Choice of Law: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 11 J. EMPIRIcAL LEGAL
STUD. 894, 902-03 (2014).
25.
Id. at 906.
26.
Id. at 905.
27.
Gilles Cuniberti, The InternationalMarket for Contracts:The Most Attractive
ContractLaws, 34 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 455, 459 (2014).
28.
Id. at 468-69.
29.
Id. at 459.
30.
Id. at 473.
31.
Id. at 464.
32.
Weidemaier, supra note 5, at 1907.
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transactions between non-US parties.3 3 In reviewing the international
contracts, Weidemaier found that New York law was chosen most
frequently (17.9 percent of clauses), followed by California (17 percent),
34
Delaware (9.8 percent), and Massachusetts (6.3 percent). When he
looked exclusively to those contracts that chose the law of a "neutral"
jurisdiction with no connection to either party, he found that New York
35
law was chosen approximately 73 percent of the time.
In 2016, Gilles Cuniberti reviewed data from cases decided by four
leading international arbitration centers with connections to Asia in
2011 and 2012.36 He found that the contracts in these proceedings
generally selected US law, English law, or Singapore law to govern
their agreements. Together, these three countries were selected in
37
approximately 85 percent of the contracts submitted to arbitration.
Cuniberti also found that the popularity of a given body of law varied
by arbitration center. While English law was widely used across all
four centers, Singapore law was more frequently chosen by parties
38
coming before the Singapore International Arbitration Center. US
law, in turn, was more commonly chosen by parties coming before the
International Centei for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), which functions
as the international division of the American Arbitration Association
(AAA). 39
There exist several international treaties that seek to harmonize
the law across jurisdictions. One of these is the CISG. Under certain
circumstances, the parties may choose to have their contract governed
by the CISG rather than national law. The existence of this treaty
raises the question of how frequently parties opt out of national sales
40
law altogether and choose to have a treaty govern their contract. In
2016, John Coyle reviewed over five thousand contracts filed with the

Id. at 1907-08.
33.
Id. at 1915.
34.
Id. at 1916.
35.
Gilles Cuniberti, The Laws of Asian InternationalBusiness Transactions, 25
36.
PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 35, 39 (2016). The four arbitration centers were (1) the
International Center for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), (2) the Court of International
Arbitration at the International Chamber of Commerce, (3) the Singapore International
Arbitration Center (SIAC), and (4) the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre
(HKIAC). Id. In each case, Cuniberti excluded arbitrations before these bodies that did
not involve any Asian companies. Id.
Id. at 59.
37.
Id. at 51.
38.
Id. at 57.
39.
See Christopher R. Drahozal, ContractingOut of National Law:An Empirical
40.
Look at the New Law Merchant, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 523, 538-42 (2005); Christopher
R. Drahozal, Private Ordering and InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 113 PENN. ST.
L. REV. 1031, 1039 (2009) (presenting empirical data showing that parties rarely choose
anything other than national law to govern their international agreements); see also
John F. Coyle, Rethinking the Commercial Law Treaty, 45 GA. L. REV. 343, 376-78 (2011)
(questioning whether international treaties are "better" than national law in the context
of international sales transactions).

2019]

DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSE

333

SEC between 1996 and 2012 that referenced the CISG. 41 He found that
99 percent of these contracts referred to the CISG to exclude it as a
source of law. 42 Only 1 percent referred to the CISG to select it as the
governing law. 43 He also found that approximately 70 percent of the
contracts that excluded the CISG did so unnecessarily because the
treaty was inapplicable by its terms. 44
There appears to be only one empirical study to date that
examines patterns of practice with respect to the other language in
choice-of-law clauses (i.e., everything except for the choice of
jurisdiction). In 2018, John Coyle reviewed 351 bond indentures filed
with the SEC in 2016 that selected New York law. 4 5 He then sought to
ascertain whether the choice-of-law clauses in these agreements (1)
excluded conflict-of-laws rules, (2) covered non-contractual claims, (3)
addressed the distinction between substantive and procedural law, and
(4) utilized the phrase "governed by."46 While the results varied
depending on the issue, Coyle found that the clauses in his sample were
riddled with loopholes and frequently lacked the language necessary to
ensure that New York law governed all aspects of litigation relating to
the indenture. 47 This finding was significant because the contracts
were generally high-dollar-value agreements drafted by lawyers at
leading law firms. If these contracts contain choice-of-law clauses that
routinely omit language necessary to lock in the law of the chosen
state, he concluded, then the same is likely true for many other
contracts. 48
B. Empirical Results: Provisionsin Choice-of-Law Clauses
Virtually all of the international supply contracts in the sample
(99 percent) included a choice-of-law clause. This subpart describes the
following provisions in those clauses: (1) jurisdiction selected; (2) the
choice between "interpret," "construe," and "govern"; (3) conflict-oflaws rules; (4) scope; (5) substance and procedure; (6) miscellaneous
issues; (7) federal law; and (8) carve-outs.

41.
Coyle, CISG, supra note 1, at 211.
42.
Id. at 220.
43.
Id.
44.
Id.
45.
See generally John F. Coyle, Choice of Law Clauses in U.S. Bond Indentures,
13 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 152 (2018) [hereinafter Coyle, Choice of Law]. Cf. Coyle, Canons,
supra note 1, at 631 (providing background and context on the default interpretive rules
that courts use to construe choice-of-law clauses).
46.
See generally Coyle, Choice of Law, supra note 45.
47.
Id. at 159.
48.
Id. at 15.
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1. Jurisdiction Selected
A total of 157 choice-of-law clauses in the sample specified 28
different jurisdictions-12 US jurisdictions and 16 non-US locations.
The identity of the chosen jurisdiction was redacted in three clauses.
Only one clause did not select a body of law to govern the contract. Far
and away the most commonly chosen jurisdiction was New York
(named in 59 clauses). The runners-up were California (15 clauses),
49
Delaware (15 clauses), and England (15 clauses). Table 2 summarizes
these findings.
Table 2. JurisdictionSelected in Choice-of-Law Clause
Non-US Jurisdiction
Number
US State
of
Clauses
England/United
59
New York
Kingdom
Switzerland
15
California
Germany
15
Delaware
China
4
Nevada
Ontario
3
Florida
Quebec
3
New Jersey
Japan
2
Massachusetts
Russia
2
Texas
For eign
Other
4
Other US State
Jurisdiction

USA

2

Redacted
Not Stated

Number
of Clauses
15
5
4
3
3
3
2
2
8

3
1

In some instances, the law chosen was the same as (a) the
principal place of business, or (b) the place of incorporation of one of
the contracting parties. In other instances, the law chosen was the law
of a "neutral" jurisdiction with no connection to either the buyer or the
seller, as reported in Table 3.
Table 3. Chosen Law as Compared to Location of Party
Number (%)
of Clauses
Law Chosen:
10 (6.4%)
State of Buyer Place of Incorporation
26 (16.6%)
State of Buyer Headquarters

One clause stated that the contract would be governed by Japanese law if the
49.
suit were brought in Japan and by California law if the suit were brought in California.
This contract was coded as choosing both Japan and California.
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Neutral Third State
State of Seller Headquarters
State of Seller Place of Incorporation

72 (45.9%)
35 (22.3%)
2 (1.3%)

Connection to Both Buyer and Seller
Unknown

3 (1.9%)
9 (5.7%)

New York was the most commonly selected neutral jurisdiction
(46 clauses), followed by England (10 clauses), Switzerland (5 clauses),
and Delaware (3 clauses).
2. Interpret, Construe, Govern
In theory, a choice-of-law clause may be framed in a near-infinite
number of ways. In practice, however, most clauses are framed in one
of three specific ways. First, a choice-of-law clause may state that the
contract will be "interpreted" in accordance with the laws of a
particular jurisdiction. Second, a clause may stipulate that the contract
will be "construed" in accordance with the laws of that jurisdiction.
Third, a clause may provide that the contract will be "governed by" the
laws of that jurisdiction.
The question of whether the precise phrase utilized in the clause
matters has generated a split among US courts.5 0 Most courts have
held that "interpret," "construe," and "govern" all mean the same
thing.5 1 A few courts have held, however, that a clause stating that the
contract shall be "interpreted" or "construed" in accordance with a
state's laws is narrower than a clause stating that the contract shall
be "governed" by that state's law. 52 These courts have held that the
words "interpret" or "construe" standing alone suggest that the parties
merely intended to select the law of the chosen jurisdiction touching on
issues of contract interpretation.5 3 These courts have refused to apply
the full breadth of the chosen jurisdiction's law to the dispute. It
follows, therefore, that the precise language used to frame the choiceof-law clause may be deemed legally significant in at least some cases.

50.
Coyle, Canons, supranote 1, at 656-60.
51.
See, e.g., C.A. May Marine Supply Co. v. Brunswick Co., 557 F.2d 1163, 1165
(5th Cir. 1977) ('The court is aware that the term 'construe in accordance with' is
technically distinguishable from the term 'governed by,' but doubts that such a fine
distinction was intended by the parties."); see also Coyle, Canons, supra note 1, at 65668.
52.
See, e.g., Arnone v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 860 F.3d 97, 107-08 (2d Cir. 2017)
("The Plan's choice of law provision, in stating that the Plan will be 'construed' in
accordance with Connecticut law, sets forth only which jurisdiction's law of contract
interpretation and contract construction will be applied. In the context presented here,
that provision is insufficient to bind this court to apply the full breadth of Connecticut
law, to the exclusion of another jurisdiction's law, in fields other than the interpretation
of the language in this contract."); see also Coyle, Canons, supra note 1, at 660 n.131.
53.
Coyle, Canons, supra note 1, at 660 n.131.
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These varying formulations may be-and frequently are-invoked
simultaneously. A clause may, for example, state that it is to be
"governed by and construed in accordance with" the laws of a given
jurisdiction. Table 4 summarizes the study's findings on this issue.
Table 4. Interpret, Construe, Govern
Number (%)
of Clauses
Interpret Only
Construe Only
Govern Only
Interpret and Construe

4 (2.5%)
5 (3.2%)

Interpret and Govern
Construe and Govern
Interpret, Construe, and Govern

20.(12.7%)
94 (59.9%)

13 (8.3%)
1 (0.6%)

15 (9.6%)
5 (3.2%)

Other

The word "govern" appears in more than 90 percent of the clauses.
The remaining clauses either utilize the words "interpret" or "construe"
exclusively (6.3 percent) or decline to utilize any of these words (3.2
percent).
3. Conflict-of-Laws Rules
In the field of conflict of laws, it is customary to distinguish
between the "internal law" of a particular jurisdiction and its "whole
law." 54 The whole law of a jurisdiction includes its conflict-of-laws
rules. The internal law of that jurisdiction does not. When a choice-oflaw clause selects the "law" of a particular jurisdiction, a threshold
question that must be answered is whether that clause is selecting the
internal law of that jurisdiction (excluding its conflicts rules) or its
55
whole law (including its conflicts rules).
The basic purpose of a choice-of-law clause is to make it
unnecessary for a court to conduct a conflict-of-laws analysis.
Accordingly, it should come as little surprise that many of the clauses
in the sample contain language directing the courts not to apply the

54.

Id. at 643.

55.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

distinction in the context of choice-of-law clauses).

§

187(3) (discussing this
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whole law of the chosen jurisdiction.5 6 This expression of intent,
however, manifests in a wide variety of ways, as shown in Table 5.57
Table 5. Conflict-of-Laws Rules
Number (%)
of Clauses
88 (56%)
29 (18.4%)
10 (6.4%)
6 (3.8%)
2 (1.3%)
36 (22.9%)

-

Without regard to conflicts principles
Without regard to rules that would lead court
to apply the law of another state
Internal laws
Treat contract as if it were to be performed
within the state by state residents
A [state] contract
Did not address issue

Eighty-eight clauses stated that the courts should apply the law
of the chosen jurisdiction "without regard to conflict of laws principles."
This is the simplest-and most widely used-means of excluding a
state's conflicts rule from the ambit of the choice-of-law clause. Ten
clauses provided that the courts should apply the "internal" laws of the
selected jurisdiction. Six clauses stipulated that the courts should
apply the law that they would apply to "agreements entered into and
to be performed entirely within the state between state residents." Two
clauses stated that the contract was to be "treated in all respects as a
[state] contract." These various formulations all seek to attain the
same basic goal-directing the courts not to apply the conflict-of-laws
rules of the chosen jurisdiction, which could bounce the parties to the
law of a different jurisdiction-and all seem likely to realize this goal.
There is, however, a wrinkle. Several US states have enacted
statutes that direct the courts within the state to enforce certain
choice-of-law clauses selecting that state's laws.5 8 These statutes are
technically conflict-of-laws rules. It follows that a provision directing
the courts not to apply the conflicts principles of the state could,
perversely, lead the court to ignore a statute specifically intended to

56.
The likelihood that a US court would ever interpret a choice-of-law clause to
select the whole law of the chosen jurisdiction is very low. There appear to be only two
reported cases in the past century where this was done. See Duskin v. PennsylvaniaCentral Airlines Corp., 167 F.2d 727, 732 (6th Cir. 1948); Carlos v. Phillips Bus. Sys.,
Inc., 556 F. Supp. 769, 774 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). In the overwhelming majority of cases,
the courts will interpret the word "law" to refer exclusively to the internal law of the
chosen jurisdiction. See Coyle, Canons, supra note 1, at 643-47.
57.
The percentage totals in the Table do not add up to 100 percent because
several clauses contained more than one of these phrases.
58.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §1646.5; DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 27, § 2708; N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401.
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59
encourage the use of choice-of-law clause. Several he clauses in the
sample sought to address this problem by stipulating that the courts
should apply the chosen law "without regard to conflict of law
principles that would cause the application of the laws of any other

jurisdiction."
4. Scope
A choice-of-law clause must define the set of disputes to which the
chosen law will apply. Will that law apply exclusively to claims for
breach of contract? Or will it also apply to tort and statutory claims
brought by one party against the other? These questions have recently
attracted a great deal of attention from courts in the United States.
These courts have consistently held that the precise language used in
in a given choice-of-law clause will determine whether it will apply only
to contract claims (a narrow scope) or whether it will also apply to noncontractual claims (a broad scope). Table 6 below summarizes the
60
language in the sample clauses that address this issue.

Table 6. Scope
Number (%)
of Clauses

Related to

12 (7.6%)

Connected with

10 (6.4%)

Non-contractual claims

6 (3.8%)

Relationship

5 (3.2%)

Related transactions

4 (2.5%)

Arising out of

2 (1.3%)

Indirectly

2 (1.3%)

Did not address issue

125 (80%)

The first-and most important-finding is that 80 percent of the
clauses (125) did not address the issue of scope. This is a remarkable
finding. One of the most significant legal risks when US companies
contract with a foreign counterparty is the risk that any dispute will
be governed by the law of a foreign jurisdiction with which the US
company is unfamiliar. When a clause does not address the issue of
scope, there arises the very real possibility that any tort or statutory
claims brought by the foreign counterparty will be governed by the law

See Coyle, Canons, supra note 1, at 647 n.75.
59.
The percentage totals in the Table do not add up to 100 percent because
60.
several clauses contained more than one of these phrases.
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of a jurisdiction other than the one named in the clause. The
overwhelming majority of the clauses did not address this risk.
Among the clauses that did address the issue of scope, the general
practice was to stipulate that the clause should be given a broad scope.
Twelve clauses stipulated, for example, that the chosen law would
apply to claims or disputes "relating to" the agreement. Ten clauses
stated that the chosen law would apply to claims or disputes "connected
with" the agreement. Six clauses specified that the chosen law would
apply to "non-contractual" claims or claims that sounded in "contract
or tort or other legal theory." Two clauses stated that the chosen law
would apply to claims arising "directly or indirectly" under the
contract. Each of these formulations is likely to be read as evidence
that the parties wanted their choice-of-law clause to apply to tort and
statutory claims that relate to the contract in some way. 61
Other clauses in the sample staked out an even broader scope.
Five clauses provided that the chosen law would apply to any claims
relating to the "relationship" between the parties. If one contracting
party wished to sue the other about a matter that was completely
unrelated to the contract, in other words, the chosen law would govern
that claim because it arose out of the parties' relationship. Three
additional clauses stipulated that the chosen law would apply to
"related" or "subsequent" transactions between the parties. Two
clauses included language that was ambiguous with respect to scope.
These clauses stipulated that the chosen law would apply to all claims
"arising out of' the agreement. US courts are currently split on
whether this language connotes a desire to give a clause a narrow scope
or a broad scope. 62
5. Substance and Procedure
Courts in the United States have long distinguished the
"procedural law" of a particular jurisdiction from its "substantive
law." 63 Substantive law is generally understood to refer to the law
relating to the right itself, whereas procedural law is generally
understood to refer to the process by which that right is enforced. 64
When a dispute has a connection to more than one jurisdiction, the
forum will generally apply its own procedural law but may typically
apply the substantive law of another jurisdiction after conducting a
conflict-of-laws analysis. 65 A recurring question with respect to
contract clauses that select the "law" of a particular place, therefore, is
whether the clause is selecting the substantive law of the chosen

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See Coyle, Canons, supra note 1, at 679.
See id. at 666-82.
See id. at 648.
Id.
Id.
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jurisdiction or whether it is selecting the substantive and procedural
law of that same jurisdiction.
Seventy-six percent of the clauses in the sample (119) did not
address this issue. Among those clauses that did address the issue,
twenty-two directed the court to apply the procedural law of the chosen
jurisdiction as well as its substantive law. These clauses followed
different paths to this end. Most stipulated that the contract was to be
"enforced" in accordance with the law of the chosen jurisdiction, a
formulation that is likely to be effective because the general view
among US courts is that the use of the word "enforced" in a choice-oflaw clause connotes an intent to select the procedural law of the chosen
jurisdiction. 66 A few stated that the law of that jurisdiction would apply
to all matters relating to "remedies" or that the agreement was to be
governed by the "substantive and procedural law" of that jurisdiction.
One clause directed the courts to apply the statutes of limitation-a
matter that approximately half of US states classify as procedural-of
the chosen jurisdiction. These findings are reported in Table 7.67
Table 7. Substance and PrQcedure
Number (%)
of Clauses
Enforced
Remedies
Procedure
Statutes of limitation

22 (14%)
4 (2.5%)
2 (1.3%)

Substantive law

1 (0.6%)
16 (10.2%)

Did not address issue

119 (76%)

Conversely, sixteen clauses specifically provided that the contract was
to be governed by the "substantive" laws of the chosen jurisdiction.
These clauses, by negative implication, directed the courts not to apply
the procedural law of that jurisdiction.
6. Miscellaneous Issues
Some of the choice-of-law clauses in the sample stipulated that the
law of the chosen jurisdiction would apply to specific issues that are
not captured in the foregoing discussion. Seventeen clauses, for
example, stated that chosen law would apply to issues relating to

See, e.g., Czewski v. KVH Indus., 607 F. App'x. 478, 481 (6th Cir. 2015);
66.
2138747 Ontario Inc. v. Samsung C&T Corp., 39 N.Y.S.3d 10, 1213 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016);
see also Coyle, supra note 1, at 655 n.113.
The percentage totals in the Table do not add up to 100 percent because
67.
several clauses contained more than one of these phrases.
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"validity." Another seventeen clauses provided that this law would
apply to issues relating to "performance" under the contract. Nine
clauses stated that this law would apply to any "breach" of the contract.
Table 8 provides further details on these and other specific issues
referenced by clauses in the sample. 68
Table 8. Miscellaneous Issues
Number (%)
of Clauses
Validity
Performance
Breach

17 (10.8%)
17 (10.8%)
9 (5.7%)

Effect
Negotiation
Execution

6 (3.8%)

Did not address issue

3 (1.9%)
2 (1.3%)
127 (80.9%)

As the Table illustrates, most of the clauses in the sample did not
address any of these issues. Moreover, it is unclear whether the parties
may choose the law that will determine questions of a contract's
validity-most courts have held that this question will always be
determined by forum law. 6 9 Nevertheless, a few clauses went out of
their way to stipulate that the law of the chosen jurisdiction would
apply to disputes arising out of the negotiation, execution, validity,
effect, performance, or breach of the contract.
7. Federal Law
In purely domestic transactions, contracts for the sale of goods will
typically be governed by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC). In international transactions, by contrast, there is a chance
that contracts for the sale of goods will instead by governed by the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods (CISG). The CISG is a multilateral treaty that serves as an
"international" version of UCC Article 2. Where there is a contract for
the sale of goods, the buyer and seller are based in different countries,

68.
The percentage totals in the Table do not add up to 100 percent because
several clauses contained more than one of these phrases.
69.
See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2001,
50 AM. J. CoM-P. L. 1, 21 (2002) (identifying "existence, validity, scope, and enforceability"
as "the four sequential logical steps that a court takes before applying the law chosen by
the clause"); see also Michael Gruson, Governing-Law Clause in International and
InterstateLoan Agreements-New York's Approach, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 207, 223 (1982)
("The parties to a contract cannot change this conflict-of-laws rule relating to the validity
of governing-law clauses.").
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and each of these countries is a party to the CISG, then the CISG will
displace national sales law and provide the governing law. However,
Article 6 of the CISG provides that the parties may opt out of the CISG
by including a statement to that effect in their contract.
International supply agreements-as international contracts for
the sale of goods-will frequently be governed by the CISG unless the
choice-of-law clauses in those agreements specifically opt out. Table 9
reports on the number of clauses in the sample that address the
potential applicability of the CISG.
Table 9. Applicability of the CISG
Number
Clauses
Opted out of the CISG
Opted into the CISG
Did not address issue

of

61 (38.9%)
1 (0.3%)
95 (60.5%)

The mere fact that a choice-of-law clause does not specifically address
the CISG does not, of course, mean that the CISG will not apply. If a
choice-of-law clause selects the law of a nation that has ratified the
CISG, and if the other criteria discussed above are satisfied, then that
treaty will supply the governing law even if the parties do not mention
it in their agreement. It is nevertheless noteworthy that 60 percent of
the agreements in the sample made no mention of the CISG one way
or the other.
8. Carve-Outs for Intellectual Property
A small number of choice-of-law clauses in the sample-fourexpressly stated that the chosen law would not apply to intellectual
property matters. One such clause stated that the contract would be
governed by the law of North Carolina but went on to state that
"matters of intellectual property law shall be determined in accordance
with the national intellectual property laws relevant to the intellectual
70
property in question."

IV. ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CONTRACTS
This Part provides a detailed look at the arbitration clauses in the
sample of international supply contracts studied here. It first discusses
prior empirical studies on the use of international arbitration clauses

Oxygen Biotherapeutics, Inc., License and Supply Agreement § 14.12 (June
70.
2
26, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/34956/0001354488130036 9/
oxbt_ex1069.htm [https://perma.cc/8NW9-7PGU] (archived Feb. 5, 2019).
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and the provisions those clauses contain. It then presents findings on
the choice between arbitration and litigation in the contracts in the
sample. Finally, it briefly describes the length and complexity of the
arbitration clauses in the sample before examining in detail the
provisions they contain.
A. Background
Arbitration has been described as the "predominant" if not the
"only" means of resolving disputes arising out of international
commercial contracts.7 ' According to surveys of international
arbitration practitioners, the main reasons parties use arbitration
clauses in their transnational contracts are (1) to avoid having disputes
resolved in the other party's home court; and (2) because the New York
Convention makes foreign arbitral awards more enforceable than
foreign court judgments. 72 Those reasons would seem to apply across
the board to all international commercial contracts, suggesting that all
such contracts should include an arbitration clause. Indeed, survey
results support the conclusion that the use of arbitration clauses is
widespread in international contracts.7 3
But other empirical evidence is inconsistent with such a broad
assertion. An often-cited study by Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey
Miller found a "surprisingly .

.

. low absolute rate of arbitration

71.
See, e.g., W. Laurence Craig, The Arbitrator'sMission and the Application of
Law in International Commercial Arbitration, 21 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 243, 251 (2010)
("Whatever the benefits on the domestic scene of comparing the merits of arbitration
with those of litigation, the comparison is neither interesting nor realistic on the
international scene where arbitration is not only the accepted but realistically the only
method of dispute resolution . . . ."); Sundaresh Menon, The TransnationalProtectionof
PrivateRights: Issues, Challenges, and Possible Solutions, 108 AM. SocY INT'L L. PRoc.
219, 234 (2014) ("[A]rbitration is likely to remain the predominant method for the
resolution of transnational commercial disputes.").
72.

CHRISTIAN BOHRING-UHLE, ARBITRATION & MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL

BUSINESS 136 (1996) ("Clearly the two most significant advantages and presumably the
two most important reasons for choosing arbitration as a means of international
commercial dispute resolution seem to be the neutrality of the forum, i.e. the possibility
to avoid being subjected to the jurisdiction of the home court of one of the parties, and
the superiority of its legal framework, with treaties like the New York Convention
guaranteeing the internationalenforcement of awards."); QUEEN MARY UNIV. OF LONDON
SCH. OF INT'L ARB. & WHITE & CASE, 2015 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY:
IMPROVEMENTS AND INNOVATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 6 (2015) [hereinafter
2015 SURVEY] (survey respondents cited "enforceability of awards" (65 percent) and

"avoiding specific legal systems/national courts" (64 percent) as the "most valuable
characteristics of international arbitration").
73.
See, e.g., 2015 SURVEY, supra note 72, at 5 (reporting that "90% of respondents
said that international arbitration is their preferred dispute resolution mechanism,
either as a stand-alone method (56%) or together with other ADR (34%)"); QUEEN MARY

UNIV. OF LONDON SCH. OF INT'L ARB. & PWC, CORPORATE CHOICES IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES 6 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 SURVEY] (52 percent

of respondents favored arbitration, while 28 percent favored court litigation).
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74
clauses: only about 20% of international contracts contain them."
(Table 10 summarizes their results by type of contract.) Indeed, based
on the Eisenberg and Miller results, some commentators have gone to
the opposite extreme, concluding that businesses, including
international businesses, prefer to have their disputes resolved in court
rather than in arbitration.75

Table 10. Use of Arbitration Clauses in Material Contracts with at
Least One Non-US Party7 6
% with Arbitration
ClueN
Type of Contract
Clause
43
18.6%
Mergers
4
0.0%
Bond indentures
12
25.0%
Settlements
77
18.2%
Securities purchase
5
20.0%
Employment contracts
11
63.6%
Licensing
46
30.4%
Asset sale purchase
20
5.0%
Credit commitments
14
7.1%
Underwriting
3
0.0%
Pooling and servicing
1
0.0%
Security agreements
36
16.7%
Other
272
20.2%
Total
The arbitration literature, however, provides a more nuanced
view, suggesting that arbitration makes more sense for some parties

74.
See Eisenberg & Miller, Arbitration, supra note 5, at 350-52; see also YaWei Li, Dispute Resolution Clauses in InternationalContracts:An Empirical Study, 39
CORNELL INTL L.J. 789, 799-800 (2006) (finding that 14.6 percent of international
merger agreements filed with the SEC between January 1, 2002, and March 31, 2003,
included an arbitration clause); Julian Nyarko, Forum Shopping on the Market for
Contracts: When Corporations Arbitrate 9, 19 (Aug. 10, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript), https://eale.org/content/uploads/2017/08/nyarkoforumshoppingeale.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FUF3-4JEM (archived Jan. 20, 2019) (based on sample of "all filings
of'material contracts' with the SEC through its electronic filing system EDGAR
between 2000 and 2016") ("Not only are arbitration clauses absent in a majority of
contracts between two business entities. There is also only a minor substantive
increase in the rate at which arbitration clauses are used in international contracts, as
compared to domestic contracts.").
See Jens C. Dammann & Henry B. Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial
75.
Litigation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 31 (2008) ("In practice, arbitration does not seem to
compete strongly with well-functioning public courts."); William J. Woodward Jr., Saving
the Hague Choice of Court Convention, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 657, 669 (2008) (arguing that
"given their choice, most businesses that negotiate contracts would prefer a judicial
dispute resolution system over arbitration").
Eisenberg & Miller, Arbitration, supra note 5, at 353.
76.
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and some types of contracts than others." First, it has long been clear
that financial institutions often prefer litigation to arbitration as a
means of resolving commercial disputes, due to the straightforward
nature of the claims and the specialized foreclosure procedures
available in court.78 Second, parties are less likely to use arbitration
clauses in contracts that may give rise to high-stakes ("bet-thecompany") disputes and disputes that may require emergency
relief 7 9-such as the corporate transactional contracts that make up a
large part of the Eisenberg and Miller sample.8 0 Conversely, and third,
parties are more likely to use arbitration clauses in contracts that may
give rise to more routine, lower-stakes disputes, or that require
particular, specialized expertise, such as construction, reinsurance,
maritime, and commodities disputes-types of contracts that generally
are not included in the Eisenberg and Miller sample. 8
Meanwhile, although much has been written about drafting
international arbitration agreements, 82 little empirical work has been
done on the terms and provisions actually included in international
arbitration agreements.
Stephen R. Bond examined 237 arbitration clauses giving rise to
ICC arbitrations in 1987 and 215 clauses giving rise to ICC

77.
See, e.g., 1 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 97 (2d
ed. 2014) [hereinafter BORN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION] ("It is probably true that, in

negotiated commercial (not financial) transactions, where parties devote attention to the
issue of dispute resolution, and where the parties possess comparable bargaining power,
arbitration clauses are more likely than not to be encountered . . . [B]ut more ambitious
statistical claims are unproven.").
78.
William W. Park, Arbitrationin Banking and Finance, 17 ANN. REV. BANKING
L. 213, 215 (1998) ("In contrast to the commercial and insurance communities, bankers
have traditionally preferred judges over arbitrators."); see 2013 SURVEY, supra note 73,
at 7 (finding that 82 percent of respondents in financial services industry preferred court
litigation to arbitration).
79.
Drahozal & Ware, supra note 12, at 455-63 ("The limited court review of
arbitration awards . . . is an important reason why parties tend to prefer litigation in
'bet-the-company' cases.").
80.
As noted above, SEC regulations require filing only of "material" contracts,
meaning contracts "not made in the ordinary course of business." 17 C.F.R. §
229.601(b)(10)(i) (2013). The regulations explain that "[i]f the contract is such as
ordinarily accompanies the kind of business conducted by the registrant and its
subsidiaries, it will be deemed to have been made in the ordinary course of business and
need not be filed unless it falls within" a specified exception. § 229.601(b)(10)(ii). Another
possible reason for the low use of arbitration clauses in the corporate transactional
contracts studied by Eisenberg and Miller is that the SEC has an informal but
longstanding policy that discourages the use of arbitration clauses in some such
contracts. See, e.g., Hal S. Scott & Leslie Silverman, SEC's Silent Opposition to
ArbitrationBylaws Is Speaking Volumes, NAT'L L.J. (Aug. 12, 2013).
81.
Drahozal & Ware, supra note 12, at 463-66.
82.
See, e.g., GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION
AGREEMENTS: DRAFTING AND ENFORCING 29-108 (5th ed. 2016) [hereinafter BORN,
FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS]. See generally PAUL D. FRIEDLAND, ARBITRATION
CLAUSES FOR INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS (2d ed. 2007).
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arbitrations in 1989.83 He found, for example, that the most common
provision added to an ICC arbitration clause was the place of
arbitration, with 57 percent of clauses in 1987 and 68 percent of clauses
in 1989 "specif[ying] the city or country in which any arbitration held
pursuant to the clause would take place"; 84 relatively few clauses
specified the number of arbitrators (24 percent in 1987 and 29 percent
85
in 1989, with a sizeable majority preferring three arbitrators); and
that fewer still clauses addressed the language of the arbitration and
post-award proceedings.8 6 Bond's study remains the leading study of
its kind, but at this point is quite dated. Moreover, it is limited to
arbitration clauses giving rise to ICC arbitrations. Thus, it necessarily
provides no information on arbitration clauses that do not provide for
ICC arbitration, much less on party choice between institutional and
ad hoc arbitration and among arbitration institutions.
Christopher R. Drahozal and Richard W. Naimark examined a
small sample of international joint venture agreements (17 contracts)
attached to SEC filings from 1993 through 1996.87 Of those seventeen
88
contracts, fifteen (or 88.2 percent) included an arbitration clause. In
addition, the study reported data on: the use of step or escalation
clauses (93.3 percent provided for some sort of negotiation before
arbitration), the administering institution (one-third chose the ICC),
the number of arbitrators (69.2 percent specified three), the language
of the arbitration (53.3 percent provided English), the scope of
discovery permitted (26.7 percent addressed), how the clause dealt
with multi-party issues (one clause (6.7 percent) permitted joinder),
damages limitations (13.3 percent precluded the award of punitive
damages) and awards of costs (6.7 percent provided for the loser to pay
arbitration costs and 13.3 percent for the loser to pay attorneys' fees),
time limits on the arbitration (13.3 percent included), and waiver of the
89
right to appeal (20 percent so provided).
More recently, Mark Weidemaier examined the dispute resolution
clauses in a sample of 402 material commercial contracts attached to
SEC filings from 2000 through 2012.90 The sample "emphasizes
commercial agreements, including manufacturing and supply
agreements, distribution agreements, licensing and development

83.

Stephen R. Bond, How to Draft an Arbitration Clause (Revisited), 1(2) ICC
&

INT'L CT. ARB. BULL. 14 (1990), reprinted in TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 65, 66 (Christopher R. Drahozal

Richard W. Naimark eds., 2005) [hereinafter Drahozal & Naimark].
Id. at 72.
84.
Id. at 75.
85.
Id. at 76-77.
86.
Id. at 59-63.
87.
For updated results, see Drahozal & Ware, supra note 12, at 466 (finding that
88.
71 percent of a sample of 31 international joint venture agreements from SEC filings in
2008 included arbitration clauses).
Drahozal & Naimark, supra note 83, at 59-63.
89.
Weidemaier, supra note 5, at 1906-07.
90.
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agreements, and marketing and other services agreements."9 1 The
contracts were a mix of domestic (60 percent) and international (40
percent), and most of his results as reported did not separate out
international contracts. 92 Exceptions included data on the use of
arbitration clauses, the governing law, and the administering
institution, for which the results were reported separately for domestic
and cross-border transactions.9 3
B. Empirical Results: Choice between Arbitrationand Litigation
The international supply contracts studied here also come from
SEC filings, and thus are subject to some of the same limitations as the
Eisenberg and Miller sample. 94 But the nature of the disputes that may
arise from international supply contracts at least plausibly may
involve lower stakes or not require emergency relief. If so, then one
would expect a greater use of arbitration clauses in international
supply contracts than in other types of material contracts.
As expected, the use of arbitration clauses is higher in the sample
of international supply contracts studied here than in the broader
Eisenberg and Miller sample. As shown in Table 11, over half (55.4
percent) of the contracts in this study's sample included arbitration
clauses, as compared to 20.2 percent of the Eisenberg and Miller
sample.95 These findings provide further evidence that the Eisenberg
and Miller findings are not representative of all types of international
contracts.
Table 11. Dispute Resolution Clauses in International Supply
Contracts
Number (%)
of Clauses
Arbitration
87 (55.4%)
Exclusive Forum Selection
41 (26.1%)
Nonexclusive Forum Selection
None

15 (9.6%)
14 (8.9%)

Total

157

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 1906 n.224.
Id. at 1907, 1923 n.288.
Id. at 1915, 1920-21.
See Eisenberg & Miller, Arbitration, supra note 5.
See id. at 351.
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C. EmpiricalResults: Length and Complexity
Commentators have criticized consumer contract terms, including
arbitration clauses, for their complexity.9 6 The Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) found that arbitration clauses in consumer
credit card agreements averaged 1108.8 words in length, ranging from
78 to 2514 words. The average Flesch-Kincaid grade level (a common
measure of complexity, with higher scores showing greater
complexity9 7 ) for the clauses was 15.6.98
Of course, the international supply contracts studied here, entered
into by sophisticated parties, do not present the same policy issues as
the consumer contracts studied by the CFPB. Nonetheless, they may
provide a baseline for comparison of the length and complexity of the
arbitration clauses used in consumer contracts." As compared to the
consumer credit card agreements studied by the CFPB, the arbitration
clauses in the international supply contracts studied here were shorter
but more complex. The average number of words in the arbitration
clauses in the sample was 474.2, ranging from 23 to 1975 words in
length, while the average Flesch-Kincaid grade level for the clauses
was 19.1.100

Michael S. Barr, Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Finance and Investor
96.
Contracts, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 793, 807 (2015) ("The length and complexity of
arbitration clauses makes consumers less likely to understand (or even to read) them.");
Jeff Sovern et. al., "Whimsy Little Contracts" with Unexpected Consequences: An
Empirical Analysis of Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements, 75 MD. L.
REV. 1, 24 (2015) ("Length and density deter consumers from attempting to read contract
terms at all, and the terms are unintelligible for most people who attempt to read
them.").
97.

CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: PRELIMINARY RESULTS

29 n.69 (2013) ("The Flesch-Kincaid Grade level translates readability to the level of
education required to understand the text. A lower grade level indicates greater
readability.").
CFPB FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 28. The CFPB's findings for arbitration
98.
clauses in general purpose reloadable (GPR) prepaid card agreements and storefront
payday loan agreements were similar. Id. at 28-29 (reporting arbitration clauses in GPR
prepaid card agreements to average 1082.6 words in length, ranging from 24 to 2970
words, and to have a Flesch-Kincaid grade level of 15.0; and arbitration clauses in
storefront payday loan agreements to average 1421.3 words in length, ranging from 167
to 2860 words, and to have a Flesch-Kincaid grade level of 15.4).
See also John C. Coates TV, Why Have M&A Contracts Grown? Evidence from
99.
Twenty Years of Deals 14 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 333, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2862019 [https://perma.cc/
WN75-ECEK] (archived Jan. 15, 2019) [hereinafter Coates, Why Have M&A Contracts
Grown] ("In linguistic complexity, as measured by the Flesch-Kincaid grade level
measure, the same [M&A] contracts increased from an average of -20 in 1994 to -30+ in
the 2010s.").
100. Because of redactions in the contracts we are unable to calculate accurately
the percentage of the contract made up by the dispute resolution clause or otherwise
compare the dispute resolution clause to the rest of the contract.
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D. EmpiricalResults: Provisions in ArbitrationClauses
This subpart describes the following provisions in the arbitration
clauses in the sample of international supply contracts: (1)
step/escalation clauses; (2) scope of the arbitration clause; (3) carveouts from arbitration; (4) delegation clauses; (5) ad hoc
arbitration/choice of institution; (6) hearing location or arbitral seat;
(7) language of the arbitration; (8) arbitral tribunal; (9) arbitral
procedures; (10) confidentiality; (11) remedies; (12) awards and costs;
and (13) post-award proceedings.
Three general notes:
First, the results reported in this subpart are generally based on
eighty-six international supply contracts with arbitration clauses. One
additional contract included an arbitration clause (making the total
number of contracts with arbitration clauses eighty-seven), but it
incorporated by reference terms from another agreement that was
unavailable, so in most cases it is not included in the analysis here.10 1
Second, the provisions examined here can only be understood in
context of the rules that otherwise would govern the arbitration
process. Those rules can come from either the governing arbitration
law or from the institutional rules to which the parties have agreed. As
a result, the fact that the arbitration clauses do not commonly include
a particular provision, for example, may not be significant if the rules
that otherwise govern do.
Third, one overall question this subpart also considers is the
extent to which arbitration clauses vary from the model clauses
proposed by arbitration institutions. Gary Born has made what seems
to be an empirical assertion that "[i]n the overwhelming majority of
cases .

.

. international arbitration agreements are straightforward

exercises, adopting either entirely or principally the model, time-tested
clauses of a leading arbitral institution." 102 This subpart will test that
assertion in this sample of contracts by examining, among other
provisions, the language in the arbitration clauses defining the scope
of the obligation to arbitrate and identifying the arbitral seat.
1. Step/Escalation Clauses
Multi-tiered dispute resolution clauses provide for various steps,
such as negotiation among executive officers or mediation, that must
occur before a dispute can go to arbitration. Commentators have noted
significant use of such provisions (also known as "step" or "escalation"

101. See supratext accompanying note 95. The clause did include a step/escalation
clause, and so the number of observations for that type of provision in the sample is also
87.
102. BORN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 77, at 210.
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clauses) in international contracts.1 0 3 The data are consistent with this
observation. 104 Over 75 percent of the clauses in the sample (67 of 87)
included some sort of requirement of negotiation or mediation before
the parties could go to arbitration, as shown in Table 12.105 Clauses
including mediation were relatively unusual, with only six clauses (of
87, or 6.9 percent) requiring mediation before the dispute could be
arbitrated.
Table 12. Step/Escalation Clauses
Number (%)
of Clauses
Negotiation by senior executives
Negotiation by senior executives
mediation
Some lesser negotiation requirement
Multi-tiered without mediation
Multi-tiered with mediation
None

24 (27.6%)
with
3 (3.4%)
25 (28.7%)
12 (13.8%)
3 (3.4%)
20 (23.0%)

2. Scope of the Arbitration Clause
An arbitration clause must define the set of disputes that the
106
Almost
parties are agreeing to submit to arbitration (i.e., its scope).
scope
general
broad,
had
sample
the
in
clauses
arbitration
of
the
all
of
types
specified
to
certain
limited
was
which
one,
but
(all
provisions

103.

IBA GUIDELINES FOR DRAFrING INT'L ARBITRATION CLAUSES T 86 (2010)

[hereinafter IBA GUIDELINES] ("It is common for dispute resolution clauses in
international contracts to provide for negotiation, mediation or some other form of
alternative dispute resolution as preliminary steps before arbitration."); Klaus Peter
Berger, Law and Practiceof Escalation Clauses, 22 ARB. INT'L 1, 1 (2006) ("Escalation
clauses . . . are being increasingly used in international construction and engineering
contracts.").
104. See also Weidemaier, supra note 5, at 1911 (finding, in sample of domestic
and international material contracts, clauses providing for negotiation only (36.1
percent), mediation only (3.0 percent), some multi-tiered process (5.2 percent), and no
requirement (55.7 percent)).
105. Table 4 distinguishes between clauses providing for negotiation and clauses
providing for multiple tiers of negotiation, based on the language of the clause. This
distinction may not be meaningful in practice to the extent parties without multi-tiered
clauses nonetheless have representatives negotiate before a dispute is referred to senior
executives.

106. FRIEDLAND, supra note 82, at 61 ("It is essential that an arbitration clause
cover precisely the subject matter that the parties intend be submitted to arbitration.");
Daniel M. Kolkey & Richard Chernick, Drafting an EnforceableArbitration Clause, in
PRACTITIONER'S HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION § 2.02[1],
at 15 (Daniel M. Kolkey et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012) ("The first step in drafting an arbitration
clause is to determine the scope of the disputes that are to be arbitrated.").
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disputes). But the variation in phrasing of the scope provisions is
striking. Arbitration institutions commonly offer model arbitration
clauses for parties to incorporate into their contracts, although those
model clauses vary in how they define the scope of the obligation to
arbitrate.10 7 In the sample of international supply contracts, however,
the parties rarely followed the scope provisions in the model clauses:
only nine of the clauses (of 86, or 10.5 percent) included language
matching one of the leading model clauses.1 0 8 The Bond study of ICC
arbitration clauses had a similar finding.1 09
Even more notable is the large degree of variation in each of the
central elements of the scope provisions in the arbitration clauses in
the sample.1 10 The eighty-six clauses used twenty different
formulations of the disputes subject to the arbitration clause, with
"dispute" or "disputes" the most common (29 clauses), "dispute,
controversy, or claim" the second most common (23 clauses), and
"controversy or claim" the third most common (11 clauses). They used

107.

See AM. ARBITRATION Assoc., COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

RULES AND

MEDIATION PROCEDURES 8 (2013) ("Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to

this contract, or the breach thereof . . . ."); INT'L CTR. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, GUIDE
TO

DRAFTING

INTERNATIONAL

DISPUTE

RESOLUTION

CLAUSES

2,

https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document-repository/ICDR%2Guide%20to%20
Drafting%20International%2ODispute%2OResolution%20Clauses%20-%2OEnglish.pdf
(last visited Jan. 17, 2019) [https://perma.cc/376N-9QPM] (archived Jan. 17, 2019)
[hereinafter ICDR DRAFTING] (using the same language as the AAA); JAMS CLAUSE
WORKBOOK: A GUIDE TO DRAFTING DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES FOR COMMERCIAL

CONTRACTS
2
(2018),
https://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMSRules/JAMS-ADR-Clauses.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5W5-X9CB ] (archived Jan. 19, 2019)
("Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, including
the formation, interpretation, breach or termination thereof, including whether the
claims asserted are arbitrable .... ); Arbitration Clause, INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-and-adr/arbitration/standardicc-arbitration-clauses/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2019) [https://perma.cc/9JFH-UVBJ]
(archived Jan. 17, 2019) [hereinafter ICC Standard Arbitration Clauses] ("All disputes
arising out of or in connection with the present contract. . . ."); UNCITRAL ARBITRATION
RULES, Annex (2010), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/
arbitration/arb-rules-revised/pre-arb-rules-revised.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F4DD-Q236]
(archived Feb. 23, 2019) ("Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to
this contract, or the breach, termination or invalidity thereof. . . .").
108. Four largely tracked the language of the AAA model clause; three largely
tracked the language of the ICC model clause; none used the JAMS model clause; and
two used a clause very similar to the UNCITRAL model clause. See generally sources
cited supra note 107.
109. See Bond, supra note 83, at 69-70. "Of 1987's 237 arbitration clauses [giving
rise to ICC arbitrations], the standard clause, word-for-word, was used exactly once. Of
1989's 215 clauses, it was used thrice." Overall, "the standard ICC clause, with perhaps
minor variations in wording, was used in 47 arbitration clauses (20%) in 1987 and in 21
arbitration clauses (10%) in 1989, generally with the addition of the place of arbitration."
Id.
110. The counts of differences that follow do not treat terms as different because
one is singular and the other is plural, because they use a different form of the word (i.e.,
"arise under" and "arising under" are coded as a single variation), or because the key
words are in a different order. Similarly, it ignores the use of "any" versus "all" as a
modifier in the provision.
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thirty-five different formulations to describe the source of the dispute,
with "contract" or "agreement" the most common (31 clauses) and
"contract, or breach thereof' (10 clauses) the second most common. And
they used twenty-one variations of the language describing the
relationship between the two, with "arising out of or relating to" the
most common (31 clauses) and "arising out of or in connection with" the
second most common (11 clauses)."'
Overall, combining the three elements, the eighty-six clauses in
the sample contained seventy different formulations of scope language
with no formulation being included in more than four contracts. The
four most common formulations were: controversy or claim arising out
of or relating to the agreement or breach thereof (4 clauses); dispute
arising out of or in connection with the agreement (3 clauses); dispute
arising out of or relating to the agreement (3 clauses); and dispute
arising under the agreement (3 clauses).
Ultimately, however, the variations in language-clear examples
have little legal
of encrusted contract boilerplate' 1 2-likely
most if not all of
treat
would
courts
significance. Almost all American
narrow ones),11 3
than
(rather
clauses
as
broad
these scope provisions
applying a "pro-arbitration" policy in interpreting the clause and
finding the clause to apply to a range of disputes collateral to the
contract. 114

111. Compare BORN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 77, at 205 ("Where
are a handful of formulae that are frequently used to define the scope of arbitration
clauses. These formulae include 'any' or 'all' disputes: (i) 'arising under this Agreement';
(ii) 'arising out of this Agreement'; (iii) 'in connection with this Agreement'; and (iv)
'relating to this Agreement.' Alternative formulations are also used, including: (v) 'all
disputes relating to this Agreement, including any question regarding its existence,
validity, breach, or termination'; or (vi) 'all disputes relating to this Agreement or the
subject matter hereof."').

112.

Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An

Analysis of the InteractionsBetween Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L.

subject to what we
REV. 261, 289 (1985) ("Formulations [of boilerplate terms] are ...
term encrustation, an overlaying of legal jargon to the point that the intelligibility of the
language deteriorates significantly.").
113.

RESTATEMENT OF THE U.S. LAW OF INT'L COMMERCIAL AND INV'R-STATE

ARBITRATION § 2-15, reporters' note (ii) to cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. Tentative Draft No. 7,
2019) ("Courts regularly assess the breadth in which an arbitration agreement is
couched, characterizing certain clauses as 'broad' or 'narrow.' Some courts have held that
this characterization must be made as the first step in the analysis, while others, without
so holding, ascribe significance to the characterization when interpreting particular
phrases

in

arbitration

agreements.")

(citations

omitted);

BORN,

COMMERCIAL

ARBITRATION, supra note 77, at 1201 ("Historically, a number of U.S. judicial decisions
distinguished between 'broad' and 'narrow' arbitration clauses.").
114.

BORN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 77, at 1326. But see Cape

Flattery Ltd. v. Titan Maritime, LLC, 647 F.3d 914, 922-24 (9th Cir. 2011) ("[U]nder an
arbitration agreement covering disputes 'arising under' the agreement, only those
disputes 'relating to the interpretation and performance of the contract itself are
Ssangyong
v.
Inc.
Enterprises,
(quoting Mediterranean
arbitrable.")
Construction Co., 708 F.2d 1458, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983)); Tracer Research Corp. v.
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3. Carve-Outs from Arbitration
Parties to arbitration clauses with broad scope provisions may
limit the scope by carving out certain claims from arbitration.
Commentators counsel against the use of carve-outs, 115 but they are
common in domestic US arbitration clauses.116
The international supply contracts studied here commonly used
carve-outs. As can be seen in Table 13, almost 60 percent of arbitration
clauses in the sample used some form of carve-out: 37.2 percent carved
out claims for provisional relief, 18.6 percent carved out intellectual
property or patent claims, and 17.4 percent carved out equitable claims
or claims for injunctive relief.11 7 These findings are consistent with
O'Hara O'Connor and Drahozal's view that "the vast majority of these
contractual provisions preserve rights to proceed in court in order to
protect information and innovation." 18
Table 13. Carve-Outs from Arbitration
Number (%)
of Clauses
Provisional Relief
Intellectual Property/Patent
Equitable Claims/Injunctive Relief
Breach of Confidentiality Obligation
Other
None

32 (37.2%)
16 (18.6%)
15 (17.4%)
6 (7.0%)
6 (7.0%)
35 (40.7%)

National Environmental Services Co., 42 F.3d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. dismissed,
515 U.S. 1187 (1995) (construing "arising under" narrowly).
115. BORN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 77, at 205 ("Although these
types of provisions can serve legitimate objectives, it is usually better to avoid efforts to
exclude particular types of disputes from arbitration, except in unusual circumstances.
Such exclusions often lead (undesirably) to parallel proceedings in both the arbitral
forum and national courts, and to jurisdictional disputes over the application of a clause
to particular claims."); BORN, FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS, supra note 82, at 33-34

("Ordinarily, exclusions from the scope of the agreements to arbitrate should be avoided
except in unusual circumstances," identifying "injunctive relief for intellectual property
rights" and "validity of intellectual property rights" as possible examples).
116. Christopher R. Drahozal & Erin O'Hara O'Connor, Unbundling Procedure:
Carve-Outs from Arbitration Clauses, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1945, 1966-67 (2015) (finding
carve outs common in domestic US arbitration clauses, but reporting that, except for
technology agreements, "carve-outs are included in relatively few international and
foreign agreements"); Erin O'Hara O'Connor & Christopher R. Drahozal, Steps Toward
Evidence-Based IP: The Essential Role of Courts for Supporting Innovation, 92 TEx. L.
REV. 2177, 2189 (2014) ("Carve-outs were common in all of the types of contracts we
studied") [hereinafter O'Hara O'Connor & Drahozal, Steps].
117. Many clauses included only one carve-out, but some included more than one.
118. O'Hara O'Connor & Drahozal, Steps, supra note 116, at 2180-81.
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4. Delegation Clauses
The default rule under US law is that courts have the final
authority to rule on challenges to the validity of the arbitration
agreement, while arbitrators have final authority over challenges to
11 9
the validity of the contract that includes the arbitration agreement.
Courts always have final authority to rule on issues of assent to either
the arbitration agreement or the underlying contract (unless the
120
parties agree post-dispute to have the arbitrator decide).
In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, however, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that parties could by contract delegate authority
to the arbitrator to decide challenges to the validity of the arbitration
agreement, reversing the default rule in the Federal Arbitration Act
21
(FAA) that courts have the final authority to resolve such issues.1
(The Court had previously suggested the possibility in First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan.122) Delegation clauses are common in
23
consumer financial services contracts.1
But delegation clauses are much less common in the international
supply contracts studied here. Only 4.7 percent (4 of 86) of the
arbitration clauses in the sample included language that might be
construed as a delegation clause. That said, US courts, with only rare
exceptions, have held that the most common international arbitration
124
Because
rules contain language that operates as a delegation clause.

119. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF THE U.S. LAW OF INT'L COMMERCIAL AND INV'RSTATE ARBITRATION § 2-14 & cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. Tentative Draft No. 7, 2019).
120. Id. § 2-12(a).
121. Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 70 (2010) ("An agreement to
arbitrate a gateway issue is simply an additional, antecedent agreement the party
seeking arbitration asks the federal court to enforce, and the FAA operates on this
additional arbitration agreement just as it does on any other.").
122. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 946 (1995) (holding
that "First Options cannot show that the Kaplans clearly agreed to have the arbitrators
decided (i.e., to arbitrate) the question of arbitrability").
123. CFPB FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 41 ("Although none of the arbitration
clauses in the samples directly tracked the language used in Rent-A-Center, many of the
arbitration clauses included language delegating to the arbitrator the authority to rule
on the enforceability of the arbitration clause. The share ranged from 39.3% of
arbitration clauses in our sample of checking account contracts (covering 51.6% of
arbitration-subject insured deposits) to 63.4% of arbitration clauses in our sample of
storefront payday loan contracts (covering 39.3% of the market), although none of the
mobile wireless arbitration clauses studied included a delegation provision.").
Interestingly, some of the consumer financial services contracts contained what
might be called "anti-delegation clauses," reserving to the courts issues that otherwise
might be decided by the arbitrators. Id. ("From 7.0% of arbitration clauses in the
storefront payday loan contracts (covering 28.4% of arbitration-subject storefronts) to
13.6% of arbitration clauses in credit card contracts (covering 42.6% of arbitrationsubject credit card loans outstanding) to 26.2% of arbitration clauses in checking account
contracts (covering 22.4% of arbitration-subject insured deposits) included such a
provision."). Our sample did not include any such provisions.
124. See, e.g., Oracle Am., Inc. v. Myriad Grp. A.G., 724 F.3d 1069, 1074-75 (9th
Cir. 2013) (citing "prevailing view" that incorporation of the UNCITRAL arbitration
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most arbitration clauses in the sample provided that the arbitration
would be governed by some such set of rules,1 25 the absence of
delegation clauses may have little practical effect.
5. Ad Hoc Arbitration/Choice of Institution
A central choice faced by drafters of arbitration clauses is between
institutional arbitration-with an arbitration institution providing
administrative services for the arbitration-and ad hoc arbitrationwith the arbitral tribunal itself handling administration of the case.
Most of the arbitration clauses in the sample (77 of 86, or 89.5 percent)
chose a particular arbitration institution to administer the arbitration.
Only nine (of 86, or 10.5 percent) of the arbitration clauses provided for
ad hoc arbitration. Six of the nine ad hoc clauses specified an
appointing authority or a set of arbitration rules or both; the other
three did not.126
The remaining clauses provided for arbitration to be administered
by an arbitration institution. Not surprisingly, given that most
contracts in the sample had at least one American party, the most
frequently chosen institution (30 of 86, or 34.9 percent) was the AAA,
or its international branch, the ICDR. The ICC was a close second (29
of 86, or 33.7 percent), with the LCIA (4 of 86, or 4.7 percent) and JAMS
(3 of 86, or 3.5 percent) third and fourth, respectively. For the other
administering institutions agreed to in clauses in the sample, see Table
14.
Table 14. Choiceof Ad Hoc or InstitutionalArbitration
Number
(%)
of
Clauses
Ad Hoc-Rules or appointing authority specified
Ad Hoc-No rules or appointing authority specified

6 (7.0%)
3 (3.5%)

rules "is clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed that the arbitrator
would decide" issues of arbitral jurisdiction); Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 554 F.3d
7, 11 (1st Cir. 2009) (same for AAA arbitration rules); Shaw Grp. Inc. v. Triplefine Int'l
Corp., 322 F.3d 115, 121-22 (2d Cir. 2003) (same for ICC arbitration rules); but see
RESTATEMENT OF THE U.S. LAW OF INT'L COMMERCIAL AND INV'R-STATE ARBITRATION

§ 2-8, reporters' note (iii) to cmt. b (AM. LAw INST. Tentative Draft No. 7, 2019) (rejecting
the view that current institutional rules should be treated as delegation clauses).
125. See infra text accompanying note 126.
126. Of the six ad hoc arbitration clauses that specified either an appointing
authority or arbitration rules (or both), one named CPR as the appointing authority; two
chose the CPR Non-Administered Arbitration Rules; one selected the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules and named the Atlanta International Arbitration Society as the
appointing authority; one selected the 1996 UK Arbitration Act (for an arbitration seated
in London); and one specified the 1996 India Arbitration and Conciliation Act (for an
arbitration seated in New Delhi).
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Arbitration
(American
AAA/ICDR
Dispute
for
Centre
Association/International
Resolution)
CIETAC (China International Economic and Trade
Arbitration Commission)
Court of Arbitration of the Saint-Petersburg and
Leningrad Region
CPR (International Institute for Conflict Prevention
and Resolution)
HKIAC (Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre)
ICC (International Chamber of Commerce Court of
International Arbitration)
JAMS (formerly Judicial Arbitration and Mediation
Services, Inc.)
LCIA (formerly London Court of International
Arbitration)
RFCCI (International Commercial Arbitration Court
at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the
Russian Federation)
SIAC (Singapore International Arbitration Centre)
SCC (Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber
of Commerce)
AAA if in US; ICC if not
Total

30 (34.9%)
1 (1.2%)
2 (2.3%)
2 (2.3%)
1 (1.2%)
29 (33.7%)
3 (3.5%)
4 (4.7%)

1 (1.2%)
1 (1.2%)
2 (2.3%)
1(1.2%)
86

6. Hearing Location or Arbitral Seat
All but eight arbitration clauses in the sample specified some
location for the arbitration. A total of seventy arbitration clauses in the
sample specified twenty-two different locations, ten US locations and
twelve non-US locations. Another four specified the respondents' place
of business (most commonly by name of the city), in one the place of
arbitration was to be agreed on by the party (but could not be either
party's principal place of business), and in three the arbitral seat was
redacted. Far and away the most commonly specified locations were
New York (named in 29 arbitration clauses) and London (named in 13
clauses). Table 15 summarizes the specified locations.
Table 15. Location Specified in Arbitration Clause
Non-US City
Number
US City/State
of Clauses
London
29
New York
Hong Kong
3
San Francisco
Paris
2
Chicago
Singapore
1
Atlanta
Stockholm
1
Delaware

Number of
Clauses
13
2
2
2
2
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Los Angeles
Miami
Raleigh
San Diego
Washington D.C.

1
1
1
1
1

Toronto
Beijing
Geneva
Montreal
Moscow
New Delhi
Zurich

2
1
1
1
1
1
1

Others:
None
Redacted

8
3

1
2

Party agreement

1

Respondent's city
New
York
or
London
San Diego or Tokyo

1

Of the seventy-eight clauses that specified a location for the
arbitration (including the three in which the location was redacted),
barely a third (29 of 78, or 37.2 percent) expressly labeled the location
as the "place" or "seat" of the arbitration, or identified it as the place
the award would be issued.1 2 7 The place or seat of an international
arbitration is of critical importance because it determines the
applicability of the New York Convention, the governing arbitration
law, and the country in which actions to vacate the award must be
filed.1 28 If the arbitration clause

does not specify the place of

arbitration, international arbitration rules typically provide for the
arbitrators to determine it.1 2 9

As shown in Table 8, the remaining clauses that named a location
for the arbitration did not identify it as the place or seat. Instead, they
used language that expressly identified the location as where the
arbitral hearing would take place (1 clause, or 1.3 percent) or used
language that was ambiguous as to whether it was specifying the place
of arbitration or the location of the hearing. The clauses referred to the
"venue" or "location" of the arbitration (4 of 78, or 5.1 percent); stated
that disputes would be "referred," "submitted," or "subject to"
arbitration (4 of 78, or 5.1 percent); stated that disputes would be
"settled," "resolved," or "determined by" arbitration in the specified
location (7 of 78, or 9.0 percent); or provided that the arbitration would

127. Two of the clauses provided that the specified location was both the arbitral
seat (or the place the award is issued) and the location of any arbitral hearings. See supra
Table 8.
128. BORN, FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS, supra note 82, at 56-59.
129. Id. at 58; see, e.g., IN'TL CTR. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION RULES, art. 17(1) (2014) [hereinafter ICDR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

RULES]; UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 107, art. 18(1); ICC Standard
Arbitration Clauses, supra note 107. The place of arbitration can be, but is not
necessarily, where the arbitration hearing takes place. BORN, COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION, supra note 77, at 1596-97.
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be "conducted," "held," or would "occur" or "take place" in (or at) the
specified location (33 of 78, or 42.3 percent).1 30
As a practical matter, the ambiguity in the clauses may not matter
because courts and arbitration institutions may nonetheless construe
13 1
But at a minimum, the
the provision as naming the arbitral seat.
arbitration
international
that
evidence
language provides further
clauses of
sample
the
not
track
do
here,
studied
those
clauses, at least
32
well as
as
institutions,1
arbitral
Leading
arbitration institutions.
33
clauses
arbitration
that
recommend
leading commentators,
this
to
avoid
arbitration
of
"seat"
specifically identify the "place" or
that
follow
not
do
sample
the
in
possible ambiguity. Most of the clauses
advice, as shown in Table 16. A possible explanation is that the drafters
were influenced by drafting practices in US domestic arbitration, in
which the arbitral seat is not a particularly relevant concept. At least
some commentators recommend that parties to US domestic
arbitration clauses use language like that found to be used in the
clauses studied here (that is, not referring to the place or seat of the
arbitration).1 34 The extent to which drafting of domestic arbitration

130. See supra Table 10. The other possibility is that the parties wanted only to
identify the place where any arbitral hearings would be held and did not intend to
identify the place or seat of the arbitration. Given how such language often is
interpreted, such a drafting choice would be even more problematic. See infra note 131
and accompanying text.
131.

BORN,

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,

supra note

77,

at 2074

("[P]arties

sometimes refer merely to a geographic location, without specifying for what purpose
(e.g., as the arbitral seat, location for hearings, location of an arbitral institution, or
something else). In general, courts and arbitral institutions interpret such references as
specifying the arbitral seat.").
132. ICDR DRAFTING, supra note 107, at 2 ("The place of arbitration shall be [city,
(province or state), country] []"); UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 107 ("The
place of arbitration shall be . . . [town and country.]").

133.

See, e.g., IBA GUIDELINES, supra note 103, at §2

¶

13 ("The place of arbitration

shall be [city, country]"); see also BORN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 77, at

2070-71 ("It is desirable to avoid references to the 'situs,' 'venue' or 'forum' of the
arbitration. In principle, these terms should have the same meaning as either 'place' or
'seat.' Nonetheless, they also connote either a requirement that the arbitral hearings and
meetings be conducted in the designated 'venue' or 'forum' . . . or that the designated
location is not intended as the arbitral 'seat,' but merely as a geographic location for
hearings. Similar confusion may arise where the arbitration agreement designates
where the arbitral tribunal shall'meet'. . . [T]he foregoing usages (referring to the venue,
situs, or forum) produce unnecessary certainty and should be avoided as a drafting
matter.").
134. See, e.g., DAVID ALLGEYER, ASS'N OF CORP. COUNSEL, SAMPLE ARBITRATION
CLAUSES WITH COMMENTS, http://www.acc.com/_cs-upload/vl/membersonly/Sample

FormPolicy/4097031.pdf

[https://perma.cc/NU4P-9VJJ]

(last visited Jan. 17, 2019)

or any other place agreed
, _
("The arbitration shall be held in
upon at the time by the parties."); ADR Clauses, NAT'L ARBITRATION & MEDIATION,

2019)
23,
Feb.
visited
(last
http://www.namadr.com/resources/adr-clauses/
[https://perma.cclLZ78-RZHV] (archived Jan. 17, 2019) ("The Employee and Employer
agree that the Arbitration shall be held in the county and state where Employee
currently works for Employer or most recently worked for Employer.").
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clauses influences the drafting of international arbitration clauses
(and vice versa) is worth further research.

Table 16. Arbitral Seat or Location of Hearing
Number (%)
of Clauses
Place or Seat of the Arbitration
Seat and Where Hearings Held
Where Hearings Held and Award Issued
Hearing Shall Be Held In

27 (34.6%)
1 (1.3%)

Venue or Location of Arbitration
Refer, Submit, or Subject to Arbitration In
Settled, Resolved, Determined by Arbitration
In
Conducted, Held, Venued, or Occur, Take
Place, Brought In

4 (5.1%)
4 (5.1%)

1 (1.3%)
1 (1.3%)

7 (9.0%)
33 (42.3%)

Table 17 compares the location of the arbitration to the parties'
principal places of business, as identified in the contract.13 5 In eleven
(of 75, or 14.7 percent)1 3 6 of the arbitration clauses the location was the
buyer's principal place of business or state of incorporation. In ten (of
75, or 13.3 percent) of the arbitration clauses the location was the
seller's principal place of business or state of incorporation. In four (of
75, or 5.3 percent) of the clauses, the respondent's location (or a
location convenient for the respondent) was specified. In twenty (of 75,
or 26.7 percent) of the arbitration clauses, a neutral jurisdiction was
chosen (and in one case the clause, while not specifying a location,
provided that the location could not be either party's principal place of
business). This study classified the location of an arbitration as neutral
when it was not in the same country as either the buyer or the seller.
Because almost every contract had at least one American party, this
definition of neutrality means that none of the contracts with a US
location for the arbitration was labeled "neutral." Of the contracts with
a US location for the arbitration other than a party's principal place of
business or place of incorporation (29 of 75, or 38.7 percent), sixteen
had a US buyer and thirteen had a US seller.

135. We treated the seat as matching the principal place of business when it was
in the same country for non-US parties and the same state for US parties (with the
exception of one clause for a company located in the New Jersey suburbs of New York
City, which we treated as being in New York).
136. As noted above, eight clauses did not specify a location and in three clauses
the location was redacted.
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Table 17. Location of Arbitration Compared to Location of
Party
Number (%)
of Clauses
Arbitration Located In:
9 (12.0%)
State of Buyer Headquarters
State of Buyer Place of Incorporation
US with US Buyer

2 (2.7%)

Neutral Site
Not at Parties' Principal Place of Business
State of Respondent's Headquarters
State Convenient for Respondent

20 (26.7%)

US with US Seller

13 (17.3%)

State of Seller Headquarters
State of Seller Place of Incorporation

10 (13.3%)
0 (0.0%)

16 (21.3%)
1 (1.3%)
2 (2.7%)
2 (2.7%)

Finally, Table 18 compares the location of the arbitration to the
applicable substantive law specified in the contract. Overall, the
majority of arbitration clauses (43 of 70, or 61.4 percent) selected as
the applicable substantive law the law of the jurisdiction in which the
arbitration was located (or vice versa).
Table 18. Arbitration Clauses in which Applicable Substantive Law
Was the Same as the Location of the Arbitration
Number
Non-US City
Number
US City/State
of
(%)
of
(%)
Clauses
Clauses
8/13
London
21/29
New York
(61.5%)
(72.4%)
1/2 (50.0%)
Hong Kong
1/3 (33.3%)
San Francisco
0/2 (0.0%)
Paris
1/2 (50.0%)
Chicago
0/2 (0.0%)
Singapore
0/1 (0.0%)
Atlanta
1/2 (50.0%)
Stockholm
1/1
Delaware
(100.0%)
1/2 (50.0%)
Toronto
1/1
Los Angeles
(100.0%)
1/1
Beijing
1/1
Miami
(100.0%)
(100.0%)
0/1 (0.0%)
Geneva
1/1
Raleigh
(100.0%)
1/1
Montreal
1/1
San Diego
(100.0%)
(100.0%)
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0/1 (0.0%)

Moscow
New Delhi
Zurich
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0/1 (0.0%)
1/1
(100.0%)
1/1
(100.0%)

7. Language of the Arbitration
The majority of arbitration clauses in the sample (49 of 86, or 57.0
percent) specified English as the language of the arbitration. Only
three contracts in the sample specified some language other than
English-two (2.3 percent) provided for Russian and one (1.2 percent)
provided for both English and Chinese. Almost all of the remainder (33
of 86, or 38.4 percent) specified no language, leaving the language of
the arbitration to be governed by any applicable arbitration rules.1 37
Interestingly, the two sets of arbitration rules for the institutions
specified most commonly in the sample address the language of the
arbitration differently. Article 18 of the AAA/ICDR Rules provides that
"[i]f the parties have not agreed otherwise, the language(s) of the
arbitration shall be the language(s) of the documents containing the
arbitration agreement, subject to the power of the arbitral tribunal to
determine otherwise."1 3 8 The ICC Rules have a different emphasis,
providing that the arbitral tribunal "shall determine the language or
languages of the arbitration" and making "the language of the
contract" only one of the "relevant circumstances" to be given "due
regard" by the tribunal.' 3 9 Because all of the contracts in the sample
are in English, English would be the language of the arbitration under
the AAA/ICDR Rules unless the tribunal rules otherwise. Under the
ICC Rules, by comparison, the tribunal would decide the language of
the arbitration, with the fact that the contract was in English being a
relevant consideration.
Accordingly, one might expect parties that choose the ICC Rules
to be more likely to specify the language of the arbitration in their
arbitration clause than parties that choose the AAA/ICDR Rules. That
is what these data show, albeit based on a small sample. Half of the
parties (15 of 30) that chose the AAA/ICDR Rules specified English as
the language of the arbitration in their arbitration clause. By
comparison, 75 percent of the parties (21 of 28, with one clause
redacted) that chose the ICC Rules specified English in their
arbitration clause.

137.
138.
139.

The language specified in the remaining arbitration clause was redacted.
ICDR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 129, art. 18.
ICC Standard Arbitration Clauses, supra note 107, art. 20.
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8. Arbitral Tribunal
The default number of arbitrators specified in international
140
Data show that
arbitration rules varies, between one and three.
sole arbitrators
by
decided
are
arbitrations
ICC
of
percent
roughly 40
41
tribunals.1
three-arbitrator
by
decided
are
while 60 percent
In the arbitration clauses in the sample, 20.9 percent (18 of 86)
provided for a sole arbitrator to resolve the parties' dispute, 45.3
percent (39 of 86) provided for a three-arbitrator tribunal, 16.3 percent
(14 of 86) provided for one or three arbitrators, 4.7 percent (4 of 86)
contained some other provision, and 12.8 percent (11 of 86) did not
address the issue, as shown in Table 19. Of the clauses specifying one
or three arbitrators, five based the number of arbitrators on the
amount at stake,1 42 and nine provided for one arbitrator unless the
parties could not agree on the sole arbitrator, in which case three would
be used.
Table 19. Number of Arbitrators
Number (%)
of Clauses
One arbitrator

18 (20.9%)

Three arbitrators
One or three arbitrators
One or more arbitrators
Three or five arbitrators

39 (45.3%)
14 (16.3%)

No provision

11 (12.8%)

140.

3 (3.5%)
1 (1.2%)

Compare ICDR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 129, art. 11

("If the parties have not agreed on the number of arbitrators, one arbitrator shall be
appointed unless the Administrator determines in its discretion that three arbitrators
are appropriate because of the size, complexity, or other circumstances of the case."),
with UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 107, art. 7(1) ("If the parties have not
previously agreed on the number of arbitrators, and if within 30 days after the receipt
by the respondent of the notice of arbitration the parties have not agreed that there shall
be only one arbitrator, three arbitrators shall be appointed."), and ICC Standard
Arbitration Clauses, supra note 107, art. 12(2) ("Where the parties have not agreed upon
the number of arbitrators, the Court shall appoint a sole arbitrator, save where it
appears to the Court that the dispute is such as to warrant the appointment of three
arbitrators.").
141. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Empirical Findings on International
Arbitration:An Overview, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

14 (Thomas Schultz & Frederico Ortino eds.) (forthcoming 2019).
142. Two clauses had a $5 million threshold for a three-arbitral tribunal, one
clause had a $1 million threshold, and in two clauses the amount of the threshold was
redacted.
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All of the clauses that selected a governing set of arbitration rules
thereby also specified a method of selecting the arbitrators. 143 In
addition, 62.8 percent (54 of 86) addressed arbitrator selection directly
in some way, as summarized in Table 20. A number of clauses (11 of
86, or 12.8 percent) simply directed that arbitrators be selected in
accordance with the rules, while more (17 of 86, or 19.8 percent)
provided that three arbitrators would be selected with each party
choosing one, and the party-appointed arbitrators then selecting the
chair (i.e., following the standard process specified in arbitral rules). 144
Another 18.6 percent (16 of 86) of the clauses provided that the
arbitrators would be selected by agreement of the parties, with most
(13 of 86, or 15.1 percent) providing a back-up mechanism if the parties
could not agree. Two clauses (of 86, or 2.3 percent) selected the
International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR)
ranking or "list" process, whereby each party ranks prospective
arbitrators in order of preference and CPR chooses the candidate "for
whom the parties have collectively indicated the highest
preference." 14 5 One clause (of 86, or 1.2 percent) specified the CPR
screened selection process, under which the party-appointed
arbitrators are not informed which party selected them. 146
Table 20. Method of ArbitratorSelection
Number (%) of
Clauses
As specified in rules
By agreement
By agreement; if none:
per arbitration statute
per rules
by institution
by CPR ranking procedure
three arbitrators
three arbitrators selected per rules
Each party appoints one; arbitrators select
chair

143.

11 (12.8%)
3 (3.5%)
1
2
2
1
6
1

(1.2%)
(2.3%)
(2.3%)
(1.2%)
(7.0%)
(1.2%)

17 (19.8%)

See, e.g., ICDR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 129, art. 12;

UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 107, arts. 8-10; ICC Standard Arbitration
Clauses, supra note 107, arts. 12-13.
144. An additional three clauses (3.5 percent) provided that the chair would be
appointed by the arbitral institution, while one (1.2 percent) provided that the chair
would be appointed either by the party-appointed arbitrators or the institution.
145. INT'L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOLUTION, 2018 RULES FOR NONADMINISTERED
ARBITRATION
OF
INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTES,
Rule
6.4(b),
https://www.cpradr.org/resource-center/rules/arbitration/non-administered/2018-

International-Non-Administered-Arbitration-Rules
(archived Mar. 14, 2019).
146.

Id. at Rule 5.4(d).

[https://perma.cdYUC5-TY8J]
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Each party appoints one; institution selects
chair
Each party appoints one; chair selected by
agreement or by institution
If one arbitrator, by agreement; if three
arbitrators, each party appoints one and
arbitrators select chair
If one arbitrator, by agreement; if no
agreement, by institution; if three arbitrators,
each party appoints one and arbitrators select
chair
CPR ranking procedure
CPR screened selection procedure
No provision

3 (3.5%)
1 (1.2%)

1 (1.2%)

2 (2.3%)
2 (2.3%)
1 (1.2%)
32 (37.2%)

More than two-thirds (61 of 86, or 70.9 percent) of clauses required
147
Of those that did, the most
no special qualifications for arbitrators.
common requirement (9 of 86, or 10.5 percent) was that the arbitrators
14 8
A smaller
have some specified experience in the relevant industry.
number (5 of 86, or 5.8 percent) required some particular legal
experience, such as that the arbitrator be a retired judge or a practicing
attorney. A handful of clauses specified qualifications only for the chair
of the arbitral tribunal or for an arbitrator appointed by an institution
rather than by the parties. Finally, one clause (1.2 percent) required
the arbitrators to abide by the "CPR-Georgetown Commission
49
Proposed Model Rule for the Lawyer as Neutral"1 and one clause (of
86, or 1.2 percent) required the arbitrators to abide by the AAA's "Code
50
of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes."

147. FRIEDLAND, supra note 82, at 71 ("It is usually unwise to specify any
qualifications for arbitrators in advance.").
148. Another clause required that the party-appointed arbitrators have industry
experience, while the chair of the tribunal be a partner at an international law firm.
149. CPR-GEORGETOWN COMM'N ON ETHICS & STANDARDS IN ADR, INT'L INST. FOR
CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOLUTION, MODEL RULE FOR THE LAWYER AS THIRD-PARTY

NEUTRAL (2002), https://www.cpradr.org/resource-center/protocols-guidelines/
ethics-codes/model-rule-for-the-lawyer-as-third-party-neutral/_res/id=Attachments/
[https://perma.cc/6GSBindex=O/Third-Party-netural-create-new-cover-page-2012.pdf
EFSL] (archived Jan. 31, 2019).
150.

AM. ARBITRATION AsS'N, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL

DISPUTES (2004), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document-repository/
[https://perma.cc/4979CommercialCodeofEthics forArbitrators_2010_10_14.pdf
PH9T] (archived Feb. 23, 2019).
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Table 21. Required Qualificationsfor Arbitrators

Number

(%)

of Clauses
General experience
Industry experience
Specific legal experience
Dispute resolution and industry experience
For institutional appointees only
For chair only
For chair and institutional appointees
For chair; industry experience for all
arbitrators
None

4 (4.7%)
9 (10.5%)
5 (5.8%)
1 (1.2%)
2 (2.3%)
2 (2.3%)
1 (1.2%)
1 (1.2%)
61 (70.9%)

9. Arbitral Procedures
As noted above, most clauses in the sample, by their choice of
arbitration institution or rules, adopted some set of baseline arbitral
procedures.1 51 But standard international arbitration rules have been
criticized for giving too much discretion to the arbitrators. 152 Perhaps
in response to such concerns, a number of the clauses adopted more
specific provisions addressing various aspects of arbitral procedure.
Three clauses (of 86, or 3.5 percent) contained lengthy and
detailed provisions addressing arbitral procedure in depth. Two
clauses (of 86, or 2.3 percent) provided for court rules of evidence (one
US, one UK) to apply in the arbitration hearing, and one (of 86, or 1.2
percent) adopted the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in
International Arbitration.1 5 3
Few clauses (6 of 86, or 7.0 percent) contained provisions dealing
with multi-party disputes, although international arbitration rules
increasingly are addressing multi-party issues. 154 As seen in Table 22,
two clauses permitted consolidation, one addressed joinder, and three

151. See supra text accompanying note 126.
152. See William W. Park, The 2002 Freshfields Lecture-Arbitration'sProtean
Nature: The Value of Rules and the Risks of Discretion, 19 ARB. INT'L 279, 300 (2003) ("In
cross-cultural business arbitration, the widespread assumptions about the benefits of
arbitrator discretion may well turn out to be incorrect . ... ).
153. See IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INT'L ARBITRATION
(INTERNATIONAL BAR ASS'N 2010).

154. See, e.g., ICDR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 107, arts. 78 (addressing joinder and consolidation respectively); ICC Standard Arbitration Clauses,
supranote 107, arts. 7-10 (addressing joinder, claims between multiple parties, multiple
contracts, and consolidation respectively).
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provided that the arbitration could resolve individual claims only55
language that should preclude class arbitration.
Table 22. Multiparty Proceedings
Number (%)
of Clauses
2 (2.3%)
1 (1.2%)
3 (3.5%)
80 (93.0%)

Consolidation
Consolidation & joinder
Individual claims only
None

Roughly a quarter (21 of 86, or 24.4 percent) of the clauses
addressed the availability of discovery in arbitration in some respect,
as shown in Table 23. Indeed, sixteen of the twenty-one clauses
actually used the word "discovery" (rather than document production
or some more neutral term).1 56 Notably, three of the clauses provided
for discovery to be governed by court rules of procedure, although one
clause then limited the amount of discovery available under those
rules. Five clauses (of 86, or 5.8 percent) provided for what might be
classified as "reasonable" discovery, six clauses (of 86, or 7.0 percent)
sought to limit the amount of discovery beyond what otherwise might
be available in arbitration, and one clause (of 86, or 1.2 percent) waived
discovery altogether.

155. Provisions precluding class arbitration are much more common in domestic
consumer arbitration agreements. See CFPB FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, § 2.5.5.
156. See, e.g., Robert H. Smit & Tyler B. Robinson, E-Disclosure in International
Arbitration,24 ARB. INT'L 105, 105 (2008) ("If 'discovery' is a dirty word in international
arbitration, 'e-discovery' promises to be downright obscene."); Robert H. Smit, Towards
Greater Efficiency in Document Production Before Arbitral Tribunals-A North
American Viewpoint, ICC CT. ARB. BULL. 93, 93 (2006) ("'Discovery,' in the US sense, is
a dirty word in international arbitration."); see also BORN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,

supra note 77, at 2382 ("There are usually substantial differences between the disclosure
processes in litigation and arbitration. These differences can be sufficiently marked that
some commentators suggest that the term 'discovery,' which is used to refer to the
compelled production of evidentiary materials in some national legal systems, is a
misnomer when used in connection with international arbitration, preferring formulae
such as 'disclosure' or 'evidence-taking."'). See generally JULIAN D.M. LEw, LOUKAS A.
MISTELIS

&

STEFAN

M.

KROLL,

COMPARATIVE

INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL

ARBITRATION 567 (2003) ("In principle, discovery as understood in the common systems
does not have a place in international commercial arbitration.").
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Table 23. Discovery
Number (%)
of Clauses
Discovery per court rules
Discovery per court rules but limited
Reasonable discovery
Pre-hearing depositions
Discovery under ICC Rules

2 (2.3%)
1 (1.2%)
5 (5.8%)
1 (1.2%)
1 (1.2%)

Arbitrator may order discovery
Information requested by arbitrators

3 (3.5%)
1 (1.2%)

Limited discovery
Waives discovery
None

6 (7.0%)
1 (1.2%)
65 (75.6%)

Finally, 20.9 percent (18 of 86) of the arbitration clauses in the
sample established some sort of time limit for the arbitral tribunal to
issue its award.' 5 7 The time permitted ranged from thirty days from
selection of the arbitrators at the low end to one year from the selection
of the arbitrators at the high end. The most common time limit was
ninety days (from some starting point-either the selection of the
arbitrators or the close of the hearing). The number of days was
redacted in three of the clauses (of 86, or 3.5 percent).' 5 8
10. Confidentiality
The default rule in American arbitration law is that arbitration
agreements do not impose an obligation of confidentiality on the
parties (as opposed to the arbitrators or the arbitration institution).15 9

157. Commentators often discourage use of such time limits in arbitration clauses
because of the risk that the arbitrators will lose their authority to act once the time limit
has passed. See FRIEDLAND, supra note 82, at 88 ("In most instances, . . . the temptation
to set deadlines in advance should be avoided or tempered, because an unmet deadline
may result in an invalid award, or at least extra expense and delay if the award were
challenged due to tardiness."). One of the clauses (of 86, or 1.2 percent) in the sample
expressly stated that the arbitrators would not lose authority to act if the time limit
passed and another provided that failure to comply with the time limit was not a basis
for challenging the award.
158. A handful of clauses addressed scattered other procedural issues, including
limiting the hearing to five consecutive days or three days total (one clause each),
providing for the right to cross examine witnesses and to counsel of choice (one clause
each), and permitting telephonic hearings with arbitrator and/or party consent (two
clauses).
159. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Confidentiality in Consumer and Employment
Arbitration, 7 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 28, 30-31 (2015); RESTATEMENT OF THE U.S. LAW
OF INT'L COMMERCIAL AND INV'R-STATE ARBITRATION § 3-11 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft No. 7, 2019). But see 2018 RULES FOR NON-ADMINISTERED ARBITRATION OF

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

368

[VOL. 52:323

Only a minority of the arbitration clauses in the sample changed that
default rule: as shown in Table 24, just under 30 percent of the clauses
required some degree of confidentiality in the arbitration proceeding,
meaning that, conversely, just over 70 percent of the clauses did not
address the issue. Most of the confidentiality provisions (18 of 86, or
20.9 percent) specified that all aspects of the arbitration process be
kept confidential, while a handful (6 of 86, or 7.0 percent) provided that
materials in the arbitration proceeding be kept confidential. (The
remaining clause contained only a general reference to "confidential
private arbitration.")
Table 24. Confidentiality of the Arbitral Proceeding
-Number (%)
of Clauses
18 (20.9%)
All aspects confidential
Materials disclosed confidential
Other
None

6 (7.0%)
1 (1.2%)
61 (70.9%)

11. Remedies
The substantial majority of the contracts in the sample with
arbitration clauses (75 of 87, or 86.2 percent) included some limitation
160
on the award of consequential damages or punitive damages or both.
Some contracts had remedy limitations both in the arbitration clause
and elsewhere in the contract (21 of 86, or 24.4 percent), with the
provision in the arbitration clause typically providing that the
arbitrator was not authorized or permitted to award consequential
and/or punitive damages. These data are shown in Table 25.161 But in
most contracts (65 of 86, or 75.6 percent), the remedy limitation was
not in the arbitration clause but only elsewhere in the contract and did
not mention arbitration or the arbitrator, as shown in Table 26.162

INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES, supra note 145, Rule 18 ("Unless the parties agree otherwise,

the parties, the arbitrators and CPR shall treat the proceedings, any related discovery
and the decisions of the Tribunal, as confidential, except in connection with judicial
proceedings ancillary to the arbitration . . . and unless otherwise required by law or to
protect a legal right of a party.").
160. See FRIEDLAND, supra note 82, at 100 ("[Punitive damages are] a U.S. issue.
Punitive damages in commercial cases are virtually non-existent outside the United
States.").
161. For a discussion of the possible legal significance of this distinction, see
RESTATEMENT OF THE U.S. LAW OF INT'L COMMERCIAL & INV'R-STATE ARBITRATION, § 412, cmt. c (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 7, 2019).
162. The ICDR Arbitration Rules provide that "[u]nless the parties agree
otherwise, the parties expressly waive and forego any right to punitive, exemplary, or
similar damages unless any applicable law(s) requires that compensatory damages be
increased in a specified manner." ICDR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note

20197

DISPUTERESOLUTION CLAUSE

369

None of the twelve clauses without a remedy limitation in the body of
the contract instead included a remedy limitation in the arbitration
clause.
Table 25. Damages Limitation Not in Arbitration Clause
Number
of
(%)
Clauses
No consequential damages
21 (24.1%)
No consequential or punitive damages
45 (51.7%)
Liability cap (amount redacted)
1 (1.1%)
Buyer only: No consequential damages
1 (1.1%)
Seller only: No consequential damages
4 (4.6%)
Seller only: No consequential or punitive damages
1 (1.1%)
Redacted
2 (2.3%)
None
12 (13.8%)

Table 26. Damages Limitation in Arbitration Clause
Number

(%)

of

Clauses
Arbitrator will not award consequential or punitive
damages
Arbitrator will not award consequential damages
Arbitrator will not award punitive damages
None

9 (10.5%)
2 (2.3%)
10 (11.6%)
65 (75.6%)

Four clauses (of 86, or 4.7 percent) made clear that statutes of
limitations applicable to court actions also applied to arbitration. 16 3
Only two clauses (of 86, or 2.3 percent) addressed whether arbitrators
could decide ex aequo et bono (on the basis of equity), and both rejected
that possibility.1 64 None of the clauses even mentioned the lex

107, art. 31(5); see FRIEDLAND, supra note 82, at 101 ("No other set of arbitral rules [than
the ICDR Arbitration Rules] addresses this subject, as it is specific to the United
States."). One of the twelve clauses without a remedy limitation provided that
arbitration would be pursuant to the AAA rules, which might be construed to mean the
ICDR Arbitration Rules. Two others specifically selected the AAA's Commercial
Arbitration Rules, which do not contain a comparable provision.
163. The provisions are important because of uncertainty in US law over whether
statutes of limitations applicable to court actions also apply in arbitration. See Gary B.
Born & Adam Raviv, Arbitrationand the Rule ofLaw: Lessons from Limitations Periods,
27 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 373, 375 (2016) ("The majority position in U.S. courts is that
statutes of limitations do not apply in arbitration.").
164. International arbitration rules typically preclude arbitrators from deciding ex
aequo unless the parties have expressly agreed that the arbitrators may do so. See, e.g.,
ICDR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 129, art. 31(3); ICC ARBITRATION
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mercatoria (law merchant), although a number opted out of the
165
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.
12. Awards and Costs
All leading international arbitration rules require the arbitrators'
166
Several clauses (11 of 86,
award to be in writing and to give reasons.
requirements, while
those
reiterated
sample
or 12.8 percent) in the
to be in writing
award
the
required
another six (of 86, or 7.0 percent)
(of 86, or 2.3
clauses
arbitration
Two
reasons.
without mentioning
of the
majority
a
by
made
be
to
award
the
percent) authorized
of
international
approach
typical
the
with
arbitrators (consistent
arbitration rules 1 6 7 ),

and another two provided for some form of

168
"baseball" or final offer arbitration.

Table 27. Award
Number (%)
of Clauses
By majority
Final offer by issue; not reasoned
Final offer for price
In writing
Reasoned and in writing
Reasoned and in writing on request of either
party
None

2 (2.3%)
1 (1.2%)
1 (1.2%)
6 (7.0%)
11 (12.8%)
1 (1.2%)
64 (74.4%)

A majority of the clauses in the sample (49 of 86, or 57.0 percent)
addressed the award of arbitration costs, while slightly fewer (41 of 86,
or 47.7 percent) addressed the award of attorneys' fees. International
arbitration rules typically authorize the arbitrators to allocate costs

RULES, supra note 107, art. 21(3); UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 128 art.
35(2).
165. See Coyle, Canons, supra note 1, at 644.
166.

See, e.g., ICDR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 129, art.

30(1); UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 107, art. 34(2) & (3); ICC Standard
Arbitration Clauses, supra note 107, art. 32(2), 34 (reasoned award and requirement
that draft award be scrutinized respectively).
167.

See, e.g., ICDR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 129, art.

29(2); UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 107, art. 33(1); ICC Standard
Arbitration Clauses, supra note 107, arts. 32(1).
168. In final offer arbitration, "each party shall submit its 'last best offer,' and ...
the arbitrators must select the 'last best offer' of one party or the other (with no power
to grant any award of damages between, above, or below the 'last best offers' of the
parties)." BORN, FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES, supra note 82, at 99.
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and fees in the award.1 69 With a few exceptions, the arbitration clauses
that addressed the issue were divided between those providing for costs
to be borne as they were incurred and those that adopted a "loser pays"
rule, with the loser-pays approach in the minority. Thus, as Table 28
indicates, fifteen clauses (of 86, or 17.4 percent) required the loser to
pay the arbitration costs (sometimes unless the arbitrator determines
otherwise), while twenty-six clauses (of 86, or 30.2 percent) provided
for arbitration costs to be split equally (again, sometimes unless the
arbitrator determines otherwise or finds a claim or defense to be
unreasonable). Similarly, twelve clauses (of 86, or 14.0 percent)
required the loser to pay the other party's attorneys' fees (sometimes
unless the arbitrator determines otherwise), while twenty-five clauses
(of 86, or 29.1 percent) provided for each party to bear its own
attorneys' fees (again, sometimes unless the arbitrator determines
otherwise or finds a claim or defense to be unreasonable).17 0
Table 28. Award of Arbitration Costs
Number (%)
of Clauses
Determined by arbitrator
Loser pays
Loser pays
otherwise

7 (8.1%)
9 (10.5%)

unless

arbitrator

determines
6 (7.0%)

Split equally

12 (14.0%)

Split equally unless arbitrator

determines

otherwise
Split equally
unreasonable

169.

11 (12.8%)
unless

claim

or

defense
2 (2.3%)

See, e.g., ICDR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 129, art. 34

("The tribunal may allocate such costs [of arbitration, defined to include 'the reasonable
legal and other costs incurred by the parties,'] among the parties if it determines that
allocation is reasonable, taking into account the circumstances of the case."); UNCITRAL
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 107, arts. 40, 42 ("The costs of the arbitration [defined
to include the 'legal and other costs incurred by the parties in relation to the arbitration
to the extent that the arbitral tribunal determines that the amount of such costs is
reasonable,"] shall in principle be borne by the unsuccessful party or parties. However,
the arbitral tribunal may apportion each of such costs between the parties if it
determines that apportionment is reasonable, taking into account the circumstances of
the case."); ICC Standard Arbitration Clauses, supra note 107, art. 38(4) ("The final
award shall fix the costs of the arbitration[, defined to include "the reasonable legal and
other costs incurred by the parties for the arbitration,'] and decide which of the parties
shall bear them or in what proportion they shall be borne by the parties.").
170. Gary Born recommends that arbitration clauses use the term 'legal
representation' rather than domestic phrases such as 'costs,' 'attorneys' fees,' and the
like, which may be subject to misinterpretation." BORN, FORUM SELECTION
AGREEMENTS, supra note 82, at 79. Only one clause (of 86, or 1.2 percent) in our sample
followed that recommendation.
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Each party pays own arbitrator and other
costs split equally
Any claim waived
None

1 (1.2%)
1 (1.2%)
37 (43.0%)

Table 29. Award of Attorneys'Fees
Number (%)
of Clauses
Determined by arbitrator
Loser pays
Loser pays unless arbitrator determines
otherwise
Parties bear own
Parties bear own unless arbitrator determines
otherwise
Parties bear own unless claim or defense
unreasonable
Any claim waived
None

3 (3.5%)
6 (7.0%)
6 (7.0%)
14 (16.3%)
9 (10.5%)
2 (2.3%)
1 (1.2%)
45 (52.3%)

13. Post-Award Proceedings
The majority of arbitration clauses in the sample (50 of 86, or 58.1
percent) included an "entry-of-judgment clause" providing generally
that "judgment of the court shall be entered upon the award made
pursuant to the arbitration." 171 Gary Born explains that "[i]t is
customary to include [such clauses] in domestic US arbitration clauses
... due to language in § 9 of Chapter 1 of the [FAA], which has been
interpreted as requiring contractual agreement on judicial
enforcement of any arbitral award."1 7 2 While the requirement may well
not apply to international arbitrations subject to Chapters 2 or 3 of the
FAA, Paul Friedland nonetheless concludes that "[fjor contracts that
provide for arbitration in the United States or for. contracts where
enforcement may be sought in the United States,

. . .

it is advisable" to

17 3
include an entry-of-judgment clause.
Otherwise, relatively few arbitration clauses addressed postaward proceedings (other than by providing simply that the arbitration
award was final and binding). Two clauses (of 86, or 2.3 percent)
provided for an arbitral appeals process, albeit only for large

§9

(2012).

171.

9 U.S.C.

172.

BORN, FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES, supra note 82, at 90.

173.

FRIEDLAND, supra note 82, at 103.
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awards.1 74 No clauses opted for expanded court review of awards,
perhaps because such provisions are unenforceable under the FAA.' 75
Conversely, fourteen clauses (of 86, or 16.3 percent) provided that any
award was not subject to appeal or waived the right to appeal. US
courts do not give effect to such provisions, but some other countries
do.1 76 Finally, one clause sought to limit court review of any award to
the grounds available under Article V of the New York Convention,
while another provided that a court may "revo[ke]" an award only for
fraud or clear bias on the part of the arbitrators.1 77
Table 30. ProvisionsAddressing Post-Award Proceedings
Number (%)
of Clauses
Appellate arbitral tribunal
2 (2.3%)
No appeal
14 (16.3%)
Validity of award may be challenged only on
Article V grounds
1 (1.2%)
Award "revocable" only for fraud or clear bias
by arbitrators
1 (1.2%)
Parties agree to abide by award
1 (1.2%)
Final and/or binding award
48 (55.8%)
None
19 (22.1%)

V. FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES IN INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CONTRACTS

This Part examines the forum selection clauses in this Article's
sample of international supply contracts. Like the previous Parts, it
first discusses prior studies on point and then examines in detail the
provisions contained in the sample.

174. One clause specified $5 million as the monetary threshold, while the
monetary threshold in the other was redacted.
175. See Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008)
(stating that the power to vacate an arbitration award is limited and the ability of a court
to review those awards is limited) (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)). But see
Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 101 (Tex. 2011); Cable Connection v.
DIRECTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586, 599 (Cal. 2008) (permitting parties to contract for
expanded review in state court under state arbitration law).
176.

See RESTATEMENT OF THE U.S. LAW OF INT'L COMMERCIAL & INV'R-STATE

ARBITRATION, § 4-22 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 7, 2019). Compare Federal
Statute on Private International Law Act, art. 192 (Dec. 18, 1987) (Switz.), in 5 INT'L
HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,

Switzerland at Annex-II

(Mar. 2008)

(permitting some parties to waive right to bring vacatur action in Swiss courts), with
Code of Civil Procedure, Book TV, Arbitration, art. 1522 (Jan. 13, 2011), in 2 INTL
HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Franceat Annex 1-14 (May 2011).

177. Again, the enforceability of such provisions is questionable under US law. See
Hall Street Assocs., 552 U.S. at 584.
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A. Background
The empirical studies relating to forum selection clauses-like
those studies relating to choice-of-law clauses-may be usefully sorted
into two baskets. The first basket contains studies that seek to identify
which courts are most frequently selected in such clauses. The second
basket contains studies that are less focused on the choice of forum
than on the other language in the clause. To date, most of the empirical
research in this area has focused on the first issue.
In 2009, Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller reviewed 2,882
commercial contracts filed with the SEC over a seven-month period in
2002.178 When these contracts contained forum selection clauses-

which was true in only 39 percent of the agreements-they sought to
determine which courts were chosen most frequently. They found that
New York was the most popular choice (41.2 percent), followed by
179
Eisenberg and
Delaware (10.8 percent), and California (6.5 percent).
selection
forum
a
contained
contract
a
when
that
Miller also found
of the
percent
58
approximately
exclusive
clause, the clause was
80
majority
overwhelming
the
clauses,
exclusive
these
Among
time.'
contemplated that litigation could proceed in either state or federal
court.'

8

x Relatively

few of these exclusive

clauses dictated that

litigation must proceed exclusively in a state forum or a federal
forum.1

82

In 2012, Joseph Grundfest and Neil Miller reviewed 133 forum
selection clauses that appeared in the organizational documents
(charter, bylaws, etc.) of public companies between 1991 and 2011.183
They found that virtually all of these clauses designated Delaware as
184
They also
the forum for the resolution of intra-corporate disputes.
a single
after
modeled
were
found that 92 percent of these clauses
in 2007,
public
went
that
a
company
clause written into the charter of
area of
this
in
dependence
path
suggesting the existence of strong
85
contract drafting.'
In 2012, Matthew Cain and Steven Davidoff reviewed 1,020 public
company merger agreements filed with the SEC between 2004 and

178. See generally Eisenberg, Flight to NY, supra note 19, at 1475.
179. Id. at 1504.
180. Id. at 1511.
181. Id.
182. Id. They found that 8.4 percent of all the exclusive clauses selected a state
court to the exclusion of a federal court and that 7.5 percent selected a federal court to
the exclusion of a state court.
183. See generally Joseph A. Grundfest & Neil Miller, The History and Evolution
of Intra-CorporateForum Selection Clauses:An EmpiricalAnalysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L.
33 (2012).
184. Id. at 367-68.
185. Id. at 352.
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They found that 60 percent of the forum selection clauses in
these agreements selected Delaware as the forum in which to resolve
disputes as compared to only 11 percent that selected New York.18 7
Overall, they found that there was a "net positive flight to both
Delaware and New York from other jurisdictions." 8 8
In 2015, Mark Weidemaier reviewed 402 commercial agreements
filed with the SEC between 2000 and 2012.189 Approximately 60
percent of these agreements arose out of domestic transactions
between US companies, 34 percent arose out of international
transactions involving at least one US party, and 6 percent arose out
of international transactions between non-US parties. In reviewing the
international contracts, Weidemaier found that New York was the
forum chosen most frequently (25 percent of clauses), followed by
California (15 percent) and Delaware (10 percent).1 90 He also found
that approximately 73 percent of the forum selection clauses in the
sample were exclusive.
In 2016, John Coates sought to explain the substantial increase in
the length of the typical M&A agreement between 1996 and 2014.191
Part of the explanation, he found, lay in the fact that only 21 percent
of M&A agreements he studied executed in 1996 had a forum selection
clause as compared to 100 percent of the M&A agreements executed in
2014.192 He also found that many of the more recent agreements
selected New York as the forum to resolve any financing-related
disputes while still selecting Delaware to resolve any disputes arising
out of the merger agreement. 9 3 This finding provides support for the
conventional wisdom that New York is the preferred US forum to
resolve commercial disputes and that Delaware is the preferred US
forum to resolve corporate disputes.
2008.186

B. EmpiricalResults: Provisions in Forum Selection Clauses
This subpart describes the following provisions in the forum
selection clauses in this sample of international supply contracts: (1)
jurisdiction selected; (2) scope; (3) choice of state or federal court; (4)
consent to jurisdiction or venue; (5) forum non conveniens; (6) service
of process; and (7) enforcement of judgments.

186. Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Delaware's Competitive Reach, 9 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 92, 94 (2012).
187. Id. at 94.
188. Id.
189. See generally Weidemaier, supra note 5, at 1865.
190. Id. at 1918.
191. Coates, Why Have M&A Contracts Grown?, supra note 99.
192. Id. at 51.
193. Id. at 23.
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1. Jurisdiction Selected
A total of fifty-six forum selection clauses in the sample specified
twenty-two different jurisdictions-thirteen US jurisdictions and nine
non-US locations. The identity of the chosen jurisdiction was redacted
in one clause. The most commonly chosen US jurisdiction was New
York with California running a distant second. The most commonly
selected international jurisdiction was England, as shown in Table
31.194

Table 31. Location of Court Selected in Forum Selection Clause
Number of
Number of Non-US
US City/State
ClausesJurisdiction
Clauses
Manhattan, NY
New York State
Clara
Santa
County, CA
Delaware
Nevada
Los Angeles, CA
New Jersey
Other

12
7
5

England
Japan
Switzerland

4
2
2

5
3
2
2
6

Other

6

Redacted

1

In some instances, the forum chosen was the same as (a) the
principal place of business, or (b) the place of incorporation of one of
the contracting parties. In other instances, the law chosen was the law
of a "neutral" jurisdiction with no connection to either the buyer or the
seller, as reported in Table 32.
Table 32. Forum Location as Compared to Location of Parties
Number (%)
of Clauses
Forum Location:
3 (5.4%)
State of Buyer Place of Incorporation
State of Buyer Headquarters
Neutral Third State
State of Seller Headquarters
State of Seller Place of Incorporation
Connection to Both Buyer and Seller
Unknown

15 (26.8%)
22 (39.3%)
13 (23.2%)
1 (1.8%)
1 (1.8%)
2 (3.6%)

194. One clause stated that the contract would be governed by Japanese law if the
suit were brought in Japan and by California law if the suit were brought in California.
This contract was coded as choosing both Japan and California.
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New York was the most commonly selected neutral jurisdiction (15
clauses), followed by England (2 clauses).
2. Scope
This Article has previously discussed the issue of scope-whether
a clause covers non-contractual claims-in the context of choice-of-law
clauses and arbitration clauses. In this subpart, the Article turns to
the scope of a forum selection clause.
These clauses can be divided into five general categories with
respect to scope. First, there are the clauses whose scope is ambiguous.
This category includes clauses stipulating that a court shall hear cases
"arising out of' or "with respect to" or "under" the agreement. 9 5
Second, there are the clauses whose scope is broad. This category
includes clauses that authorize a court to hear cases "relating to" or "in
connection with" the agreement.1 96 Third, there are the clauses that
are very broad.1 9 7 This category includes clauses directing courts to
hear any dispute arising out of the "relationship" between the parties
rather than those disputes with some connection to the contract.
Fourth, there are clauses that are narrow. These clauses provide
that a court shall have jurisdiction to hear contractual claims but not
non-contractual claims.' 9 8 Fifth, and finally, there are clauses that do
not address this issue of scope. These clauses merely state that the
parties "consent to" or "submit to" venue or jurisdiction in a given court.
In practice, these clauses are likely to be assigned a broad scope
because the parties have consented to jurisdiction or venue in a given
forum without limitation. As a pure textual matter, however, they do
not specifically address the question of whether the forum selection
clause covers non-contractual claims.

195. See generally, John F. Coyle, Interpreting Boilerplate Forum Selection
Clauses, 104 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. One such clause provided that a court would have exclusive jurisdiction to
resolve disputes "commenced to interpret or enforce the provisions of this Agreement."
OEM Supply Agreement by and between Control4 Corp. and Lite-On Electronic
Company Ltd, § 21.5.2 (July 18, 2013). Another stipulated that a court would have sole
jurisdiction over any "action which in any way involves the rights, duties and obligations
of either party hereto under this Agreement." Supply Agreement by and between
Intersect Ent, Inc. and Hovione Inter Ltd, § 13.6 (June 23, 2014). Still another clause
stated that a given court must hear "[a]ll disputes between the parties as to the validity,
execution, performance, interpretation or termination of this Agreement." Supply
Agreement by and between Aceway Corp. and Shenzhen G.N.D. Technology Co., Ltd,
§ 10.3 (Aug. 12, 2013).
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Table 33. Scope
Number (%)
of Clauses
Ambiguous
Arising out of
With respect to the agreement

14 (25%)
2 (3.6%)

Hereunder

1 (1.8%)

Broad
Arising out of or in connection with
Arising out of or relating to
Relating to

9 (16.1%)
3 (5.4%)

In connection with

2 (3.6%)

Very Broad
Relationship

2 (3.6%)

Narrow
Tied to various contractual matters

4 (7.1%)

Did not address issue

9 (16.1%)

10 (17.9%)

Table 33 sorts each of the forum selection clauses in the sample
into one of these five categories. It shows that approximately 30
percent of the clauses in the sample were ambiguous with respect to
scope, 43 percent stated a broad scope, 3.6 percent evidenced a very
broad scope, and 7.1 percent had a narrow scope. Conversely, it shows
that roughly 16 percent of the clauses did not address the issue of
scope.
3. State or Federal Court
When a forum selection clause provides that a dispute must be
resolved by a court in the United States, a question that sometimes
arises is whether the chosen court is (1) a state court, (2) a federal
court, or (3) either a state court or a federal court. In many cases, the
text of the clause will provide an answer to this question by specifying
"state court" or "federal court." In other instances, however, the text of
the clause will be ambiguous. To resolve such ambiguities, US courts
have developed two default interpretive rules. The first such rule holds
that choosing to have a case resolved by the courts "of' a state is to
19 9
This is
choose a state court to the exclusion of a federal court.
because only state courts are deemed to be "of' a state. The second such

199.

Coyle, InterpretingBoilerplate Forum Selection Clauses, supra note 195.
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rule holds that choosing to have a case resolved by the courts "in" a
state is to select both state and federal courts.20 0 This is because state
and federal courthouses are located "in" that state. When these
interpretive rules are applied to the clauses in the sample, they
generate the results described in Table 34.
Table 34. Selection of State or Federal Court
Forum Location:

Number (%)
of Clauses

State court only
State or federal court
Federal court only

9 (16%)
27 (48.2%)
5 (8.9%)

Non-US court

15 (26.8%)

The danger in choosing a federal court as the exclusive forum for
any litigation, of course, is that federal courts are courts of limited
subject matter jurisdiction. If the federal court lacks diversity
jurisdiction, and if the dispute does not present a federal question, then
the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. As
a matter of best practice, therefore, parties are generally well-advised
to consent to jurisdiction in state court if the federal court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction. However, only two of the five clauses selecting
federal court as the forum contained a fallback clause stipulating that
the case would be heard in state court if the federal court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction. 2 0
4. Jurisdiction and Venue
There are two basic varieties of non-exclusive forum selection
clauses. In the first, the parties consent to jurisdiction in the chosen
forum. In the second, the parties consent to venue in the chosen forum.
There were fifteen non-exclusive forum selection clauses in the sample.
The parties consented to jurisdiction and venue in the chosen
jurisdiction in eight clauses. 202 The parties consented to jurisdiction-

200. Id.
201. See, e.g., Supply Agreement by and between Tesla Motors and Panasonic
Industrial Company, § 15(g) (Feb. 27, 2012) ('The parties hereby agree that any and all
causes of action arising under this Agreement shall be brought only in the United States
Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York or, if the United States
Federal District Court does not have jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of New York
County, and the parties hereby submit to the jurisdiction of said Court, and agree not to
object to the venue nor the convenience of the forum.")
202. Six of the clauses specified that the consent to jurisdiction in a given forum
was "irrevocable."
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but made no reference to venue-in six clauses. 2 03 These findings raise
the question of whether there is a meaningful distinction between
these two types of clauses. Does a consent-to-jurisdiction clause also
function as a consent-to-venue clause? And does a consent-to-venue
clause also function as a consent-to-jurisdiction clause?
The courts are split on these issues. With respect to consent-tojurisdiction clauses that do not reference venue, some courts have held
2 04
Other
that such clauses do function as a consent-to-venue clause.
courts, however, have held that consent-to-jurisdiction clauses that do
205
not reference venue do not function as consent-to-venue clauses.
With respect to consent-to-venue clauses that do not mention
jurisdiction, most courts have held such clauses do function as consentto-jurisdiction clauses. 206 All things being equal, therefore, a welldrafted non-exclusive forum selection clause should make reference to
both jurisdiction and venue to avoid any confusion. As discussed above,
however, this was done in just over half (8 out of 15) of the nonexclusive forum selection clauses in the sample.

203. In the one instance where there was neither a consent to jurisdiction nor
venue, the clause provided that "the injured party has the right to commence legal
actions against the other in a court of the United States of America." Although one could
debate this point, we coded this clause as a non-exclusive forum selection clause even
though the parties did not consent to jurisdiction or venue in any US state.
204. See Florsheim Grp., Inc. v. Vila, No. 01 C 3334, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17106,
at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2001) ("A consent to jurisdiction operates as a consent to venue,
as well, and precludes a motion to transfer for improper venue."); Corbin Russwin, Inc.
v. Alexander's Hardware, Inc., 556 S.E.2d 592, 596 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (observing that
a consent to jurisdiction clause waives personal jurisdiction and venue").
205. See Heller Fin., Inc. v. Shop-A-Lot, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 292, 294 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
("Although defendants submitted to the jurisdiction of Illinois courts, it does not
necessarily follow that venue properly exists in Illinois. Because jurisdiction and venue
are distinct concepts, a plaintiff who establishes jurisdiction over the defendant's person
must additionally meet venue specifications."); Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., Nat'l Ass'n
v. Gebert, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64511, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2014) (holding venue to
be improper notwithstanding consent-to-jurisdiction clause).
206. See Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 1990)
("There would be no point to a clause that placed venue in Milwaukee County ... but left
court's
the
outside
were
they
object that
to
free
defendants
the
jurisdiction."); Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Dennehy, 739 F. Supp. 1303, 1306 (E.D.
Wis. 1990) ("The court finds that when a party consents to venue in a particular court,
it implicitly consents to the exercise of personal jurisdiction by that court."); Mut. Fire,
Marine & Inland Ins. Co. v. Barry, 646 F. Supp. 831, 833-34 (E.D. Pa. 1986) ("The courts
have determined that venue selection clauses contain an implied consent to personal
jurisdiction."); Richardson Greenshields Sec., Inc. v. Metz, 566 F. Supp. 131, 133
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("A waiver of objection to venue would be meaningless ... if it did not
also contemplate a concomitant waiver of objection to personal jurisdiction."); Jacobsen
Constr. Co. v. Teton Builders, 106 P.3d 719, 728 (Utah 2005) ("[F]orum selection clauses
need not make specific mention of a consent to jurisdiction when the language of the
clause makes the parties' intention to resolve disputes in a particular forum evident.").
But see Glob. Packaging, Inc. v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813, 821 (Cal. Ct. App.
2011) ("The trial court took a clause referring to "venue," translated "venue" into "forum,"
and then extended "forum" to include personal jurisdiction. This stretches [the consentto-venue clause] beyond what its actual words can bear.").
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5. Forum Non Conveniens
The doctrine of forum non conveniens stipulates that a court that
has jurisdiction over the parties and the dispute may nevertheless
decline to hear the case when another court is "the more appropriate
and convenient forum for adjudicating the controversy." 20 7 In the
forum-selection-clause context, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is
relevant in two ways. First, where one party has filed suit in the chosen
forum, the defendant may argue that the suit should be dismissed
because the chosen forum is an inconvenient forum. In this context, the
doctrine is being deployed to evade the forum selection clause. Second,
where one party has filed suit outside the chosen forum, the defendant
may argue that the suit should be dismissed because that forum was
not the one chosen by the parties and is hence an inconvenient
forum. 208 In this context, the doctrine is being deployed to enforce the

forum selection clause.
To the extent that the sample clauses engage with the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, they do so exclusively in the first contextaddressing the possibility that a defendant may invoke the doctrine of
forum non conveniens to evade an otherwise valid forum selection
clause. Nineteen forum selection clauses (33.9 percent) specifically
waived the argument that the forum named in the clause was an
inconvenient forum.2 09 The practical effect of such a clause is to
preempt one argument-that the doctrine of forum non conveniens
forbids the case from being litigated in the chosen forum-that a
defendant might otherwise make in an attempt to evade a forum
selection clause.
6. Service of Process
In the United States, a court may only assert personal jurisdiction
over a defendant in a lawsuit when that individual has been properly
served with process. Eleven forum selection clauses (19.6 percent) in
the sample specifically addressed this issue. Seven of these stated that
service via registered or certified mail to the address listed in the
"Notices" section of the contract would constitute proper service. One
stipulated that process may be served on any party anywhere in the
world. One provided that each party consented to process served as
permitted by the law of the state of the chosen forum. And two stated
that nothing in the agreement would impact the ability of either party
to serve process in any manner permitted by law. The remaining 81.4

207. Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007).
208. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 571 U.S. 49, 63-66
(2013).
209. The remaining 37 clauses in the sample (66.1 percent) did not address the
issue of forum non conveniens.
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percent of the clauses in the sample did not address the issue of service
of process.
7. Enforcement of Judgments
If a plaintiff is successful in its claim against a defendant in the
chosen forum, that plaintiff may subsequently seek to enforce the
resulting judgment against the defendant's assets elsewhere. In
theory, the existence of an exclusive forum selection clause could
present an obstacle to such an effort. The defendant might argue that
since the parties had agreed that all litigation relating to the contract
should proceed in the chosen forum, the plaintiff is forbidden from
seeking to enforce the judgment in a different court in a different state.
The defendant might take the position, in other words, that the
exclusive forum selection clause functions as a waiver of the plaintiffs
right to enforce a judgment rendered by the chosen court in other
jurisdictions.
To head off this argument, six forum selection clauses in the
sample (10.7 percent) include language specifying that each party "may
commence an action in a court other than the [chosen forum] solely for
the purpose of enforcing an order or judgment issued by one of the
above-named courts or in connection with injunctive relief." The effect
of this language is to make clear that the parties-in agreeing to an
exclusive forum to litigate disputes relating to their agreement-do not
intend to waive their right to enforce any resulting judgment against
21 1
the defendant's assets elsewhere.

VII. CONCLUSION

While the primary object of the Article is descriptive rather than
normative-it seeks to describe the contents of agreements that have
heretofore been largely ignored by legal scholars-the foregoing
findings have normative implications for three groups: (1) legal
scholars, (2) judges, and (3) contract drafters.
In recent years, a growing number of legal scholars have sought
to better understand how boilerplate contract language evolves and
changes over time and-crucially-how much significance should be
attached to relatively small changes in such language. Perhaps the
most comprehensive body of literature has explored changes in the
language of the pari passu clause, a piece of contract boilerplate that

211. See LHO New Orleans LM, L.P. v. MHI Leasco New Orleans, Inc., No. 05C04-214 SCD, 2006 Del. Super. LEXIS 148, at *10 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 11, 2006)
language that a final judgment 'may be enforced in any other jurisdiction'
("The ...
recognizes the fact that enforcement of a final judgment may require the initiation of
proceedings outside of Louisiana where assets are located.").
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is regularly written into sovereign debt agreements. Over the course of
many years, the language of these clauses came to exhibit minor
variations. 212 These variations, in turn, present interesting conceptual
questions. Is the different language in these clauses legally significant?
Or is this just an example of random but essentially meaningless
variation in standard contract boilerplate? These questions have
preoccupied legal scholars for more than a decade. The result? Dozens
of papers-and one book-that seek to offer insight into the choice of
just a few words in this single piece of contract boilerplate.21 3
As discussed above, there are likewise a great many small
differences in contract language in the dispute resolution clauses
explored in this Article. Are these differences legally significant? Or
are they just examples of random but essentially meaningless
variations or encrustations in standard contract boilerplate? To date,
these are questions that virtually no one has sought to answer,
notwithstanding the fact that these clauses appear in many, many
more contracts than the pari passu clause. In providing a thorough
descriptive account of these variations, this Article lays the,
groundwork for future contract scholars to subject these clauses to the
same level of scholarly scrutiny that the paripassu clause has enjoyed
over the past decade.
Turning next to judges, the Article enables them to gain a better
sense for how much significance to attach to the absence of a term. If a
judge knows that many arbitration provisions in international supply
agreements contain a carve-out for provisional relief, for example, that
judge may attach more significance to the fact that the arbitration
clause in this agreement lacks such a provision. Conversely, if a judge
knows that it is exceedingly rare for a forum selection clause in an
international supply agreement to expressly waive a party's right to
seek a dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds, then that judge
may not attach much significance to the absence of such a provision in
this agreement. Obviously, there are limits to this sort of analysis. The
fact that a choice-of-law clause does not contain "excluding conflict-oflaws principles" language probably does not mean the drafters
intended to select the whole law of the chosen jurisdiction. But
knowing more about the universe of these agreements-including

212. One clause might state that the bonds "will at all times rank paripassu with
all other unsecured and unsubordinated indebtedness" while another stated that the
bonds "will rank equally in right of payment with all other unsecured and
unsubordinated" (emphasis added).
213. For a small sampling, see MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND
A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 9-12

(2013); Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in
CommercialBoilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1, 1 (2017); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Robert Scott,
& Mitu Gulati, Origin Myths, Contracts, and the Hunt for Pari Passu, 38 L. & Soc.
INQUIRY 72, 95-96 (2013).
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which provisions are standard and which are not-may help judges
make sense of the individual clauses in individual cases.
Finally, the Article has a great deal to offer to contract drafters.
Lawyers called upon to draft lengthy contracts on behalf of their
corporate clients-quite rationally-spend the bulk of their time
drafting substantive deal terms. They spend much less time focused on
the miscellaneous boilerplate provisions relating to dispute resolution
at the back of the agreement. When they must engage with these
provisions, moreover, they will frequently have relatively little
information about what provisions are "market" and which are not. In
providing insight in what words and phrases other market actors
typically write into the dispute resolution provisions in their
international supply agreements-what terms are "market," in
essence-the Article provides information that is available nowhere
else. In so doing, it provides a useful roadmap to the associate trying
to make sense of the mass of boilerplate at the back of a contract and
to the partner asked to update the firm's template agreements.
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Appendix 1. Type of Dispute Resolution Clause, by Country of Non-US
Party
Arbitration
Clause

Exclusive
Forum
Selection

Australia
5
Austria
:6
Barbados
:1
Belgium
1
Bermuda
1
Both non-US
parties
British
Virgin
Islands
Canada
10

Nonexclusive
Forum
Selection

No Dispute
Resolution
Clause

1
1

1

1

6
7
1
1
3
3

1-

2

3

3

Cayman
Islands

3

6

1

China

Total

__

22
1

_

10

1

1

12

2

Czech
Republic
Finland

1

1

France

1

Germany

10

1

1
12

2

Hong Kong

1

4
3

2
4

Israel
Italy

2
4

1

Japan

5

4

4

13
1

1

India
Ireland

1

6
8
2
5

1

10

2

2

1

1

1

1

1
1

1
1
3

3
1

_
+

1
2

1

-----

1

2

-1 7 [

1

1--

----------- _ _ - - . .... . . . . .. .

.

Mexico
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Russia
Singapore
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden

1

+

Colombia
Costa Rica

Switzerland
Taiwan
United
Kingdom
Uruguay
Vietnam
Total
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112

2

-

87
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1 41

..
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15
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14
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